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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
September 29, 1986 Conference
Summer List 23 , Sheet 2
No. 86-130
ROCK (hypnotized defend.)

Cert
to
(Hays)

-------

v.

State/Criminal

ARKANSAS

1.

Ark.

SUMMARY:

s.ct
Timely

Petr asserts she was denied the fundamen-

tal due process right to testify on her own behalf when her direct

examination was

limited

by

------

the

tc

because her memory had

been enhanced by hypnosis.

2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

scuffle with her husband.

During

Petr was

involved

in a

he altercation, petr's husband

-

-

-2-

accident, but she was unable to recall any specific details as to
how the gun was discharged.

Petr was charged with manslaughter

and found guilty by a jury.
In preparation for trial, petr's atty hired a psychiatrist to aid petr's recollection of the details of the shooting.
Before

hypnotizing

petr,

approximately an hour.
or

the

hypnotic

the

psychiatrist

interviewed

pe tr

for

No recording was made of this interview

session,

but

the psychiatrist took

handwritten

notes of what petr recalled about the shooting before undergoing
hypnosis.

During hypnosis, according to petr, petr recalled cer-

tain

facts

about

This

examination

the

gun which

showed

that

prompted

the

gun

was

discharged without pulling its trigger.

•

an

examination of

susceptible of

it.

being

Petr also recalled that

the gun in fact discharged without the trigger being pulled.
At trial, the tc made the following pre-trial order:
Defendant cannot be prevented by the Court
from testifying at her trial on criminal
charges under the Arkansas Constitution, but
testimony of matters recalled by Defendant
due to hypnosis will be excluded because of
inherent unreliability and the effect of hypnosis in eliminating any meaningful crossexamination on those matters.
Defendant may
testify to matters remembered and stated to
the examiner prior to being placed under hypnosis.
Testimony
resulting
from
posthypnotic suggestion will be excluded.
App. to Petn. A-17.
The

practical

ef feet

of

this

order

is

not

entirely

clear from reviewing the petn and the Ark. S.Ct.'s opinion.

Petr

claims that during her direct examination, she was prevented from
doing little more than paraphrase what was contained in her psychiatrist's notes concerning what she recalled prior to hypnosis.

This

limitation,

according

examination, which resulted
spons i ve

to

that

was

she

reason why
trigger."

the

the

to

petr,

continued

during

cross-

in petr appearing devious and unr e -

prosecutor's quest ions.

prevented

she was

-

-3-

from

innocent,

telling

the

that her

Petr

jury

finger

also asserts

"the most direct
was never on

the

Petn. 7.
According

to

the

Ark.

S.Ct.,

petr

was

allowed

to

testify as to the following facts:
She testified that she and her husband were
quarreling, that he pushed her against the
wall, that she wanted to leave because she
was frightened, and her husband wouldn't let
her go. She said her husband's behavior that
night was unusual, and the shooting was an
accident, that she didn't mean to do it and
that she would not intentionally hurt her
husband .

•

App. to Petn. A-13.

The

Ark.

s.

Ct.

affirmed

petr's

conviction,

the rule that hypnotically refreshed testimony is
sible.

~

adopting

se inadmis-

Relying on a number of cases which have followed the same

approach,

see especially People v.

Shirley,

31 Cal.3d 18, cert.

denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982), the Ark. Ct. ruled that hypnotically
refreshed testimony effectively renders a witness incompetent to
testify.

The Ark.

Ct.

followed

is not enhanced by hypnosis.
that

is,

the

witness,

while

the scientific view that memory

Rather,
under

the witness confabulates,

hypnosis,

make the story related while under hypnosis
The

witness,

then,

after

hypnosis,

cannot

makes

up facts

to

logically complete.
tell

the

difference

between what he or she recalls independent of hypnosis and what

-

-4he or she confabulates.

Accordingly, hypnotically enhanced tes-

timony is irreparably tainted.
The Ark. s.ct.

briefly evaluated petr's constitutional

right to testify on her own behalf.

The Ark. Ct. ruled, however,

that petr's right to testify was limited in this case.

The Ct.

relied upon two cases: Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113
(W.D. Va.

1976)

and State v. Atwood,

479 A.2d 258

(Conn. Super.

1984) • 1

CONTENTIONS:

3.

Mississippi,

410 U.S

Primarily
284

(1973),

relying

upon

petr argues

that

Chambers
limiting

v.
her

direct examination violates her due process right to testify on
her own behalf.
limit her

Petr also argues that even if the state could

testimony because she underwent hypnosis, the tc here

went too far, abusing its discretion.

4.

DISCUSSION:

Petr's contention may well deserve ple-

nary consideration by this Court.
three

states.

Ark.,

in

this

First, there is a split among

case,

and Conn.,

in Atwood,

have

adopted the view that a criminal defendant's right to testify is

1
Greenfield involved a habeas challenge of a state
conviction, inter alia, on the basis that the petr in that case
was denied the right to present an adequate defense when the
state refused to allow him to testify while under hypnosis.
In
Atwood, the Conn. Super. Ct. ruled that a criminal defendant did
not have the right to have his memory hypnotically enhanced.
In
Atwood and Greenfield, unlike the present case, the defendants
requested court approval before they underwent hypnosis, but were
denied the right to do so.

-5not

impl ica tea by preventing

facts

that per son

recalled as a result of hypnosis.

other hand,

from

testifying as

to

The Cal. s.ct., on t h e

in the very case primarily relied upon by the Ark.

Ct. here, made the following observation recognizing an exception
to i t s ~ se inadmissibility rule to hypnotically enhanced testimony:
"[W]hen it is is the defendant himself - not
merely a defense witness - who submits to
pretrial hypnosis, the experience will not
render
his
testimony
inadmissible
if he
elects to take the stand.
In that case, the
rule we adopt herein is subject to a necessary exception to avoid impairing the fundamental right of an accused to testify in his
own behalf." 2
The

one CA decision

I

could

find

dealing extensivel y

with this area discusses the divergence of views among the state
courts in dealing with all forms of hypnotically enhanced testimony.

United States v.

Valdez,

722 F.2a 1196

(1984).

CA5,

in

this case, did not deal with a defendant's right to testify, but
rather with the more common situation:

CA5 held that a prosecu-

tion witness could not testify after having his memory enhanced
through

hypnosis,

when

the

person

identified was

known by

t he

witness to be under suspicion, and when the witness had previous-

2

31 Cal.3d, at 67. The Ark. s. Ct. aia not mention this
exception to Cal.'s general rule. There is, it turns out, a
somewhat bizarre explanation for this oversight other than the
fact that the Ark. S. Ct. rejected this exception. The Pacific
Reporter version of this case omits the paragraph, quoted in the
text here, that is included in both the official reporter and the
CAl. Rptr version. Compare 31 Cal.3d, at 67 and 181 Cal. Rptr.,
at 273 with 641 P.2a, at 805. The opinion was modified on
rehearing, but the P.2a version apparently does not reflect this
change.

ly been unable

-

-6-

to make an

identification before hypnosis.

722

F.2d, at 1202.
In my view, there is a strong possibility that petr was
denied

the opportunity to fully

gun discharged.

explain her account of how the

By being forced to comply with the tc's limiting

order, I can see how petr may well have appeared to the jury to
be evasive and uncooperative.

Such an impression, in turn, could

seriously have undermined her credibility, the essential element
of her defense given the nature of this case.
A reversal in this case would be an extension of Chambers v.

Mississippi,

because

the state's

interest here

in pre-

venting "tainted" testimony appears to be much stronger than the
wrote application of the hearsay and "voucher" rules at issue in
Chambers.

See

Shirley,

hypnotically enhanced
limitations

on

a

supra

(describing

testimony

defendant's

is

right

in

great

unreliable).
to

testify

detail

Moreover,
are

why
some

acceptable.

For example, a defendant does not have the right to commit perjury.

Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
Nevertheless, Ark. here appears to have imposed a sub-

stantial limitation on the fundamental right to testify.
appears

to be

in order to better determine to what extent petr

was limited in her ability to tell her side of the story.
limitation was

A CFR

substantial,

I

If the

think a gr ant is in order to ad-

dress whether the state's interest in keeping potentially unreliable, hypnotically enhanced testimony from being admitted is sufficient

to

warrant

right to testify.

the

burden

the

state

placed

on

the

petr' s

.'

-

..
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

-7I recommend CFR.

There is no response.

September 10, 1986

Westfall

Opin in petn.
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Monday, March 23, 1987 {third argument)
I.
The
petr' s

question

Summary

presented

in

this

case

is

whether

due process rights were violated by the TC' s order

that she coulc1 not testify as to information she recalled

~--------------

during hypnosis.

II.

Background

Petr's husband died from a gunshot wound he received

•

while trying to prevent his wife from leaving their apartment.

-k_

Petr was charged with manslaughter for t h e shooting

)

-

•

of her husband.

•

Petr

--------~

page 2 •

could not remember everything about

the shooting and without consulting the court nor informing
the

prosecutor,

her

attorney

hired a

hypnosis to induce recollection.
the psychiatrist,
hour.

psychiatrist

to

use

Before hypnosis was begun,

Dr. Bettye Back,

interviewed petr for an

Included in that interview was petr's recollection of

the shooting prior to hypnosis.

No video or sound recording

--

was made of the prehypnotic session, but Dr. Back made handwritten notes of

the

session.

As

a

result

of

the second

hypnotic session, petr was later able to recall that she did
not put her finger on the trigger of the gun, and that the
gun

•

discharged

by

accident

or

mechanical

failure

of

the

safety as her husband grabbed her hand during the scuffle •

______

_,,
The TC ruled
testimony of matters recalled by petr

due

to hypnosis

inadmissible because of

its

unr el iabil i ty

and because of the effect of hypnosis on cross-examination.
Petr was allowed to testify about things she remembers prior
to being subjected to hypnosis.

Petr was convicted and sen-

tenced to 10 years imprisonment and fined $10,000.

The Ark.

Sup. Ct. affirmed, as follows:
Petr
ruling:

makes

the

been admitted,

two

arguments

hypnotically

relating

ref re shed

testimony

and in the alternative,

such testimony is inadmissible,

to

the

court's

should

have

even assuming that

the TC was unduly restric-

tive of petr's testimony.

I

Divergence of Opinion on Admissibility.

Most courts

agree that there is some inherent unreliability in hypnoti-

TC::

•

cally

refreshed

admissibility.

§

-

testimony,

but

disagree how

Jurisdictions have taken

page 3.

that

affects

hree views

The

view is that such testimony is generally admissible,

with the fact of hypnotic induction going to its credibility, not its admissibility.

Th ~

view is to admit the

testimony when it has been obtained pursuant to certain procedures designed to ensure its reliability.

The ~

view

is that such testimony is inherently unreliable and is inadmissible per se.
Current

'!'reno

Toward

Exclusion.

The more

trend is toward exclusion of such testimony.
on Evidence §20 6

•

( 3d ed. 198 4) •

recent

See McCormick

Typical of this trend is

Maryland, which in 1968 admitted such testimony but reversed
its position in 1982.

Courts adopting the rule of exclusion

often rely on the test announced in Frye v. United States,
293 F. 2d 1013 (CADC 1923), that an expert witness "may not
testify on the basis of scientific methodology unless the
principles on which he relies have achieved general acceptance within the scientific community."

We need not decide

if the Frye test is the sole test of admissibility, because
we would find it inadmissible even under the rules of ev i-

--

dence.

Expert Opinion.

While hypnosis may have gained rec-

ognition as an aid to therapy,

it has not gained general

acceptance as a means of ascertaining truth in the field of

•

forensic law.
clusion of

Cases comprising the recent trend toward ex-

hypnotically

refreshed

testimony

have

examined

•

-

page 4.

extensively the expert opinions in this field and have concluded that it is inherently unreliable and without sufficient acceptance to allow it in the courtroom.

The dangers

of hypnosis in memorv retrieval are summed up in People v.
Guerra, 690 P. 2d 635

(Cal. 1984):

the subject's capacity

to judge the reality of his memories is impaired;
to

recall

"memories"

he is apt

that never existed, yet be convinced

those memories are real;

he will produce on demand a recol-

lection of an event which may be a compound of actual facts,
irrelevant

matter

and

highly

plausible

"confabulations";

hypnosis artificially increases the subject's confidence in
both his true and false memories and may enhance his credi-

•

bility as a witness due to an attendant ability to increase
dramatically the amount of detail, or the emotion with which
those details are reported, though they may be simply "artifacts of the hypnotic process."
that juries will

There is also a likelihood

place greater emphasis on testimony pro-

duced by hypnosis.
Courts
have

been

rejecting

equally

hypnotically

concerned

with

the

refreshed
effects

testimony
on

cross-

examination, where the difficulties in memory retrieval and
fabrication are compounded.

The conviction on the part of

the subject that he or she is stating the truth affects the
truth

finding

process

traditionally

tested

by

cross-

examination •

•

Conditional Admissibility.
not allow hypnotically refreshed testimo

that if we do

•

page 5.

we should adopt the guidelines of State v. Hurd, 432 A. 2d
86 (N.J. 1981).

These guidelines are as follows:

whenever

a party seeks to introduce a witness who has undergone hypnosis to refresh memory, the party must inform the opponent
of his intention and provide him with the recording of the
session and other pertinent material.
admissibility,

considering

the facts

The TC rules on the
and circumstances to

determine whether the procedure followed in the particular
case was a reasonably reliable means of restoring the witness' memory.

These considerations should include the rea-

son for the los s of memory and the possible motivation to
recall a certain version of the events.

•

should be followed:

(1) a doctor experienced in the use of

hypnosis should conduct the session;
be
any

independent,

Certain procedures

not

regularly

(2)

used by

the doctor should
the attorney;

( 3)

information given to the hypnotist before the session

should

be

recorded;

( 4)

before

hypnosis,

the

hypnotist

should obtain from the subject a detailed description of the
events

recalled;

(5)

all

contacts between the hypnotist

and the subject must be recorded;

and ( 6) only the hypno-

tist and the subject should be present during the session.
we note that petr has not fully
guidelines,

followed the Hurd

but are disinclined to follow it in any case.

As other courts hav~ noted, the Hurd guidelines do not fully

•

address the dangers of hypnosis.

To adopt the guidelines

would

process

simply

burden the

ensuring reliability.

pretrial

further

without

-

•

Petr's Testimony Restricted.

page 6 •

The general

response

of courts has been to allow testimony proved to have been
recalled before hypnosis.
route.

Petr has not demonstrated how the DC strayed from

this ruling.
record

The DC in this case chose this

of

Th e burden was on petr to establish a reliable

her

preh~1 pnotic

memory.

She

cannot

now

claim

error because the DC restricted her to the record she off ered.

The DC limited its restrictions to the day of the

shooting.

Petr argues that it should have been limited to

the shooting itself.

The record reveals that the session

covered the day of the shooting as well as other times,
if anything the order was generous.

•

better

record of

her

so

Petr suggests that a

prehypnotic memory would be her

memory as opposed to the doctor's notes.

own

This would be cir-

cumventing the very danger of hypnosis.
Constitutional

Right

To

Testify.

Petr

maintains

that the rule of excluding hypnotically refreshed testimony
should

not

be

a p plied

to

defendants

-

because

-

it violates

their constitutional right to testj fy on t__heir own ~

half.

But even a defendant's right to testify is not without limits.

Even defendants are subject to the rules of procedure

and evidence.
In Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113 ( 1976)
the same argument was made by a defendant who had no recollection of

•

the

crime,

a murder •

He argued that hypnotic

testimony was the only evidence he could off er in his defense,

that it would be a violation of his constitutional

-

•

page 7.

✓

rights to deny him the right to testify, citing Chambers v.
Mississippi,
guishable.

410

U.

s.

284

The cases are

(1973).

distin-

Chambers primarily found a hearsay exception for

evidence offered by the defense because of reliability.

The

Greenfield court pointed out that it was excluding the hypnotically induced testimony for the very reason that it was
unreliable:

"This court knows of

no rule that requires a

judge to accept evidence of uncertain value to go to a defense that is otherwise completely uncorroborated.

The mere

fact that a crime has no witnesses or direct evidence does
not warrant a court to accept evidence that may be able to
tell the trier of fact something about the crime, but may be

•

of dubious quality."
We adopt the same rule.

Petr's testimony was re-

stricted only by what, in effect, are standard rules of evidence.

The probative value of the proffered testimony

questionable,

but

in

any

case,

it

is

substantially

weighed by the other considerations discussed.

Here,

is

outpetr

was able to relate to the jury her version of the shooting,
that it was an accident.

In reality nothing was excluded

that would have been of much assistance to petr,
have enlarged on her

testimony

or would

to any significant degree.

Yet given the available information on the effect of hypnosis and the attendant difficulties of
state's
•

desire

to

confine

petr' s

prehypnotic memories is warranted.

such testimony,
testimony

to

the
the

-

•

-

Petr's Out-of-Court Statement.

page 8 •

Petr alleges error

in the TC's exclusion of a statement in a police officer's
report,

attributed to

petr,

hand and it went off."
say.

Petr

that

she

"had the gun in her

The statement was excluded as hear-

relies on Fed.

R.

Evid.

80l(d), which provides

that a statement is not hearsay if "consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge
against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive."

The statement does not come within the exception.

For the rule to apply,

the prior consistent statement must

be made before a motive to falsify has arisen.

Petr's mo-

tive in describing the shooting as an accident at the time

•

of arrest was the same as it would be when giving the testimony at tri al.

The TC was thus correct in excluding it as

hearsay.
III.
A.
The Ark.
that the lower

Sup.

Analysis

Due Process

Ct.

correctly identified three views

courts have

taken on the admissibility of

hypnotically induc~d testimony.
that have adoptel them are:
1.

These views, and the courts

~c:_,4--~

Complete Adrnissibil ity.

d-

These courts view hyp-

notic refreshment just like any other type of refreshment of
testimony,

e.g., refreshment by showing the witness a writ-

ing to stimulate the witness' memory.

•

Under this view, the

fact that hypnosis was used goes to credibility, not admissibility.

The courts adopting this view are:

CA6 1986 (ap-

<I-} "f,

r,Lu,-,__

~

6t:..

-

•

plying Tenn. 1 aw);
1977;

Ill.

1971;

CA9 1978;

1 97 9 ;

App.

Tenn. Crim. App. 1981;
2.

Fla. 1982;

S.D.
1983;

La.

page 9 •

E.D.

1983;

N.D.

Mich.

Or.

App.

Wyo. 1982.

Procedural Safeguards.

The leading case in this

1 ine is Hurd (N.J. 1981), noted by the Ark. Sup. Ct. in this
case.

Other

are:
Ind.

courts that have adopted the Hurd safeguards

CAB 1985;
1982;

CA5 1984;

Ohio App.

military CA 1984;

1984;

N. M.

App.

Idaho 1984;

1981;

Miss.

1984;

Wisc. 1983.
3.

General

These courts generally

Admissibility.

apply the Frye test and determine that hypnosis as a scientific process has not become generally accepted as reliable

•

and therefore its products must be excluded per se.
courts

are:

"Al aska 1986; "Ariz.

1982; ~ rk.

1985; ✓
o1O. App. 1982; V'Conn. 1984; ~
\Hawaii

1985; Vian.

1985; vi.id.

1982; "'riinn. 1984; vito. 1985; ~
Crim. App. 1984; v§a. 1981;
1.

1986; ._-Cal.

el. 1985;

1983; ~

ss.

b. 1981; ~

These

IPt"a. 1985;

1983;'-" Mich.
- 1983;

O"lcla.

vfash. 1984.

Per Se Inadmissibility

Arkansas has taken the strictest of three views of the
admissibility

of

hypnotically

refreshed

testimony.

The

court analyzed the scientific 1 iterature and the trend of
the

lower

through

courts

hypnosis

and
is

determined

i herently

that

unreliable.

correct that this view is the trend.

•

testimony
The

obtained
court

is

The trend relies pri-

marily on literature by two experts, Dr. Martin Orne and Dr.
Bernard Diamond, both of whom have published articles on the
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•

value

of

hypnotically

ref re shed

testimony.

-

Both

conclude

that testimony obtained through hypnosis is unreliable because of the very process of hypnosis.
safeguards

cannot

prevent

the

That is, procedural

inherent

problems.

These

problems are that the witness is very susceptible to suggestion under hypnosis -- either suggestion by the hypnotist or
a suggestion by the lawyer or someone else before hypnosis;
that

subjects feel

compelling

to comply with

that they rememner the events in question,

the request

so that memory

may be distorted to please the hypnotist or someone else;
that subjects are likely to confabulate,
gaps in their memory with fantasy.

•

e.g., fill in the

After the subject has

engaged in any of these techniques, however, he is not aware
of it, but instead is convinced of the truth of his memory.
Given these authorities and the utter lack of rebuttal authority offered by petr, the Ark. Sup. Ct.'s conclusion that
such testimony is unreliable appears reasonable.
Because she does not try to establish the reliability of hypnotically ref re shed testimony, petr' s real argument seems to be that a defendant must be allowed to testify
as to anything that might help her defense.
narrowly,

Viewed more

her argument could be that any doubt as to rel i-

abil ity must be resolved in favor of a defendant.
bers v.

Mississippi, 410

u. s.

2 84

In Cham-

( 197 3) , you, writing for

the Court, found that state rules of evidence violated due

•

process by
fense.

preventing a

You noted:

defendant from presenting his de-

~ ~

-

•

-
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The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses
and to call witnesses in one's own behalf have
long been recognized as essential to due process •
••• Of course, the right to confront and to crossexamine is not absolute and may, in appropriate
cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interest in the cri~inal trial process.
E.g., Mancusi
v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972). But its denial or
significant diminution calls into question the
ultimate "integrity of the fact-fin ding process"
and requires that the competing interest be closely examined.
Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314,
315 (1969).
Id., at 295.
al

In that decision, you implied that a procedur-

rule could be justified as

"serv[ing]

some valid state

purpose by excluding untrustworthy testimony."
In this case,

Id., at 300.

the Ark. Sup. Ct. has found that the

testimony sought to be offered is inherently untrustworthy.
•

If this determination is accepted, then its exclusion actually aids the "integrity of the fact-finding process" rather
than

detracts

from

untrustworthiness

of

In

it.
the

this

statements

is

situation,
compounded

the

by

the

fact that cross-examination cannot reveal the weaknesses in
the testimony because after hypnosis a subject tends to believe that what he recalls is the truth.

The state interest

is in limiting the presentation of evidence to that which is
trustworthy.

The defendant's interest is in presenting evi-

dence that will help her defense.

But her only legitimate

interest can be in presenting truthful evidence in support
of her defense,

•

right

to

commit

because she does not have a constitutional
perjury.

The

state

court

has

determined

that the testimony to be offered is not trustworthy.

To the

extent that the judgment that all hypnotically enhanced tes-

•
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timony is untrustworthy is reasonable, the balance struck by
the Ark. Sup. Ct. between the interests of the state and the
defendant appears reasonable.
2.

Case-b

roach

The CAB in Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771
F. 2d 1112§

makes the best argument in favor of adopt-

ing a variation on the middle position -- that of procedural
safeguards:

•

•

A per se rule [either of admissibility or inadmissibility] would remove the question from the
discretionary realm of the district court.
If we
were to estai)-1 ish a per se rule of inadmissibility, relevant, reliable testimony would in some
instances be automatically disallowed and would
hamper the truthfinding function of our system. A
rule of per se inadmissibility is impermissibly
broad and may result in the exclusion of valuable
and accurate evidence in some cases. • • • On the
other hand, if we adopt a per se rule of admissibility, in some circumstances, evidence that was
unreliable because of the methods used in hypnosis
and prejudicial because the jury may be overly
influenced by testimony obtained from hypnotic
recall would be admitted and that too would have
an undesirable effect on our judicial system ••••
A per se rule of inadmissibility does not cure the
risks of undue prejudice and jury confusion.
Accordingly, we adopt a flexible rule on the adrnissibil ity of hypnotica ly en anced testimony that
enables the district court to determine the question on a case-by-case basis.
We are satisfied
that, if the hypnosis session is properly conducted in appropriate cases, the hypnotically enhanced
testimony does not run afoul of the Frye test to
the extent it is applicable.
we adopt a rule which requires the district
court, in cases where hypnosis has been used, to
conduct pretri al hearings on the procedures used
during the hypnotic session in question and assess
the effect of hypnosis upon the reliability of the
testimony before making a decision on adrnissibili ty.
The proponent of the hypnotically enhanced
testimony bears the burden of proof during this
proceeding.
In addition, we adopt a version of
the Hurd safeguards to the extent that the dis-

-

•

-
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trict court should consider whether and to what
degree the safeguards were followed when making
its determination that the hypnotically enhanced
testimony is sufficiently reliable. Other factors
the district court should take into account are
the appropriateness of using hypnosis for the kind
of memory loss involved, and whether there is any
evidence to corroborate the hypnotically enhanced
testimony. The district co urt must then determine
whether in view of all the circumstances, the proposed tes t imony
is sufficiently reliable and
whether its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, if any, to warrant admission.
Ul timately the district court must decide whether the
risk that the testimony reflects a distorted memory is so great that the probative value of the
testimony is destroyed.
By out ruling today we place this hypnosis evi- 1
dentiary problem directly within the control of
the distric
we think the better ap roach
is for the
·strict cou
an no
e jury o make
the preliminary determination of aami S'sibil ity as
is the case with other evidentiary questions. See
Fed. R. Ev id. 104 (a) •
It is our hope that this
case-by-case method of determining the admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony will guard
against the problems of hypnosis, especially undue
suggestiveness and confabulation, but also allow
for the inclusion of reliable refreshed memory
which hypnosis can at times u
r certain circumstances produce.
In sum, we hol
that the district court should, Def ore
ri , scrutinize the
circumstances surroun c:rnrg--rh e hypnosis session,
consider whether the safeguards we have approved
were followea and determine in light of all the
circumstances if the proposed hypnotically enhanced tes t imony is sufficiently reliable and not
overly prejudicial to be admitted.

•

Id., at 1122-1123.
The analysis of the CAB is convincing and raises the
question of whether a state court can declare all hypnotically

•

refreshed

indicia of

testimony

reliability

inadmissible

regardless

in the particular

case •

of

the

As noted

above, the general rule that such testimony is untrustworthy
is supported by scientific authority.

Therefore, its exclu-

•

-
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sion is supported by the state interest in ensuring the accuracy of the truth-finding process at trial.

Nevertheless,

the Court may find that where a criminal defendant's rights
are at stake,
quired.

a more exacting case-by-case analysis is re-

By making an individual determination of reliabil-

ity according to t h e facts and circumstances of the particular case, the court could more precisely safeguard both the
state's

and

the

defendant's

interests

in

accurate

truth-

fi n ding.
3.

Recommendation

In sum, whether state courts should have the discretion to declare a rule of per se inadmissibility of hypnoti-

•

cally enhanced testimony

is a \ ~ lose question)

On the one

hand is the fact that the rule is supported by scientific
authority, and that state courts should have broad leeway in
establishing rule s of evidence to ensure the reliability of
criminal trials.

On the other hand is the fact that author-

ity on the question of hypnotically enhanced testimony is
divided.

The rule in this case, applied to criminal defend-

ants, limits their constitutional

right to testify in their

own defense.

exclude some relevant and

reliable

A per se rule ~

information.

Unlike

a

hearsay

exception,

which

depends on the fact that there exists a more reliable means
to introduce the evidence, there is no other means to introduce evidence of a witness' recall.

The importance to crim-

inal defendants of certain testimony in certain cases,

and

the fact that a case-by-case determination would protect the

•

government's
support

asserted

interest

the modified procedural

in

accurate

safeguard
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fact-finding,

rule adopted by

the CAB.
But here the Court is faced with an area of the law
where s f ~ entif ~

on ~ ~dedj and strong state inter-

ests are at stake.
court,

If faced with the question as a trial

the best view would probably be the modified view of

the CAB.

Yet this Court is faced with the question of what

limits the Constitution imposes on the state courts' discretion.

Where there is such uncertainty, it may be better to

allow the lower courts broad leeway to evaluate the worth of
the

I

technique

This is no t
fendant,

of

hypnosis

and

fashion

appropriate

rules.

really a question of the state versus the de-

because

against the state.

this

rule

of

exclusion

may

often

cut

Police departments often use hypnosis as

an investigative tool, and in these cases it would be to the
state's advantage to introduce the testimony gained thereby.
Thus,

it seems that the lower courts can be trusted to keep

in touch with the development of the hypnosis technique and
to fashion rules designed to promote fair trials.

Affirming /

the decision of the court in this case would mean only that

-

state courts are free to adopt t h e ~ se rule of exclusion,
not that they must do so.

Other lower courts can keep the

rules that they have adopted and all courts are free to reevaluate their decisions in 1 ight of developing scientific

•

evidence.

-

•

4.
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Other Questions Raised

The State argues that even if an error is found in
this case,

it was harmless.

This determination,

if neces-

sary, is properly made by the lower court on remand.
Note also that amicus the State of California identifies a fourth position taken on the introduction of hypnosis by the Cal.
18,

cert.

Sup.

denied,

Ct.

459

in People v.

u. s.

860

Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d

(1982).

This

position is

that "the testimony of a witness who has undergone hypnosis
for

the purpose of

restoring

his memory of

the events in

issue is inadmissible as to all matters relating to those
events,

•

Id.,
rule.

from

the

at 66-67.

time

of

Criminal

the

hypnotic

defendants

are

session
exempt

forward."
from

this

Amicus wants the Court to find this fourth approach

unconstitutional.

While the Cal. Sup. Ct.'s holding may be

questionable as applied in certain cases,

there appears to

be no need to reach the issue in this case since the Ark.
Sup. Ct. has not gone so far, and not even the Cal. Sup. Ct.
applies the rule to criminal defendants.
B.

Right to Counsel

As a ~ lated argumen§ ,

petr contends that the TC's

order denied her due process because it limited petr's right
to effective as istance of counsel.
raised before the Ark.

Sup.

cert petition to this Court.

•

Ct.

This argument was not

and was not raised in the

To the extent that it is in-

corporated in the general due process argument, its resolution would appear to be the same.

She argues that hypnosis

I

is an

page 17.

important investigative tool and that she should be

able to testify to anything discovered through the aid of
counsel.
her

But by its terms, the TC' s order only applied to

recall

through

hypnosis.

Any

evidence

through any other means was admissible.

discovered

Moreover, petr al-

leges that she was prompted to investigate the firing mechanism of the gun after her recall in hypnosis.

This evidence

Since this argument appears to be

was admitted at trial.

only an adjunct to the primary due process argument and was
not raised below,

this Court should decline to address it

------------ -

separately.
~

C.

•

Limitation to Prehypnotic Statements as Arbitrary
Petr

argues

that

the

TC

arbi tr ar ily

1 imi ted

her

prehypnotic testimony to exactly what was in the hypnotist's
notes.

This claim also was not raised before the Ark. Sup.

Ct. and therefore is not properly before the Court.

In any

event, petr's description of the limitation of the order is
highly questionable.
was generous,

The Ark. Sup. Ct. found that the order

and allowed her ample leeway to explain her

prehypnotic recollection.
Petr seems to be rearguing the evidentiary ruling by
the

court

that

a

statement

in

a

police

officer's

could not be admitted as a hearsay exception.

report

First, this

is a state evidentiary question that does not warrant this
Court's

•

review •

Second,

the contested statement was read

into evidence at least 5 times, so any allegation of prejudice is untenable.

Third, the court properly found that the

•
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hearsay exception for consistent statements to rebut recent
fabrications applied only to statements made before the motive to fabricate occurred.

Petr implicitly argues that the

fact that the statement occurred before hypnosis is enough.
But hypnosis has the inherent danger of incorporating prior
motives to fabricate,
rect.

so the court's holding appears cor-

Certainly the ruling is not so arbitrary as to deny

petr due process.
D.

Effect of Numerous Objections

Petr finally argues that the application of the TC's
order was arbitrary because of the numerous clar if ica tions
required while petr was on the stand.

•

Again, this argument

was not raised below or in the cert petition and is best
ignored.

On the merits, it appears that the TC was making a

genuine attempt to ensure that petr's rights were protected
by making a decision whether numerous different statements
in different contexts should be admissible.
may have been confusing to the jury,

Al though this

it does not appear to

be a cause for a constitutional complaint.

1.
the

The Ark.

trend of lower

IV.

Conclusion

Sup.

Ct.

determined,

after

examining

court authority and expert viewpoints,

that hypnotically refreshed testimony is generally untrust-

-

worthy.

This determination appears reasonable.

has held that although defendant's trial

This Court

rights are impor-

tant, they may yield to substantial state interests.

Here,

the state interest is in presenting reliable information to

~

-

•

the jury.
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It seems that the balance of interests would at

least allow the state to exclude testimony found to be untrustworthy.

2.

The real question is whether a state can make an

testimony is unreliable per se.

This is a close question.

------------Scientific
evidence supports the state court's conclusion.
But the

right of

crucial.

The Due Process Clause may require that when the

reliability of
case-by-case
quired.

•

the defendant to present his defense is

certain testimony

determination

However,

of

is uncertain,

its

at least a

trustworthiness

is

re-

the better view appears to be that where

the scientific evidence is so uncertain, state courts should

~--------

It ) 9 ~~
is difficult to say that the Constitution requires the ad~ ~

be left the maximum freedom to form rules of evidence.

mission of evidence of dubious scientific validity.
ing

the Ark.

Sup.

Ct.

in this case does not

Affirm-

disturb the

ability of other lower courts to retain or adopt rules of
broader admissibility.
3.
are

merely

Petr's other arguments were not raised below and
extensions

of

her

due

process

argument.

She

claims that exclusion of the hypnotically induced testimony
unconstitutionally burdened her right to prepare a defense,
that the TC arbitrarily limited her prehypnotic testimony to
the notes of the hypnotist, and that the numerous objections
•

be the state during her testimony were confusing and thereby

-

•

•

•

violated due process.
merit •
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MEMORANDUM

To:

Justice Powell

From:

March 24, 1987

Leslie

No. 86-130, Rock v. Arkansas
Attached is the CA8's decision in Sprynczynatyk discussing the admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony.

The CA8
____,

adopted the middle position between per se admissibility and per
se inadmissibil i ty.

This position leaves the admissibility with-

in the DC's discretion after holding a pretrial hearing on the
nature of the testimony.
best

approach.

The

Viewed de novo, this appears to be the

question

is

whether

should be allowed the discretion to ado p t

state

supreme

courts

the rule of per se in-

admissibility if they determined that it is warranted.

Petr ar-

gues that the Due Process Clause prohibits states from adopting a
per

se

rule of

admissibility,

at least

as applied to evidence

page 2.

offered by a criminal defendant, because such a broad rule necessarily excludes some reliable testimony and therefore infringes
on the defendant's right to call witnesses and testify on his own
behalf.

The problem is that the scientific literature is mixed,

so it is difficult to tell
reliable.

how likely it is that testimony is

But, as I recall, even the state conceded at oral ar-

gument that some hypnotically induced testimony will be reliable.
It's argument is that it is difficult to tell if any particular
testimony is reliable and the jury function should not be reduced
to uguess work.~
A reasonable holding would be that since a certain amount
of hypnotically

induced testimony

___

is 1 ikel

-----

violates due process to

11.

to be_____, reliable,
,

Instead,

trial

it
-----

courts

should have the discretion to examine the circumstances of each
case

to

determine

testimony.
sented

to

the degree of

reliability

of

the particular

Only that deemed sufficiently reliable would be prethe

.. guess work u

jury.

than

Then,

the

in any other

evaluate testimony.

Thus,

jury's task would
type of

case

be

no more

in which it must

the case-by-case method would better

protect both the interests of the state and the defendant by allowing some reliable testimony in, but excluding testimony without sufficient indicia of reliability.
It seems that the DC would have reached the same result
even if it had applied the CA8's suggested procedures.
less,

the

proper

result

if

the

Court

adopts

a

Neverthe-

different

rule

would appear to be to remand for proceedings consistent with the
opinion.
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known and identifiable persons. To support this position, they cite an article written by Professor Ronald Polston, the author of the original draft of the Act, a
modified version of which the legislature
enacted. Polston, Legislation, Existing

and Proposed, Concerning Marketability
of Mineral Titles, 7 Land & Water L.Rev.
73 (1972). In his article, Polston stated
that the purpose of the Act was to facilitate the development of mineral resources
by eliminating stale claims of persons who
have left the area and are no longer locatable. Id. In this case, appellants argue,
any person interested in developing their
mineral interest could have located them
and arranged to purchase or lease that
interest.
We conclude, for two reasons, that the
Mineral Lapse Act should apply to appellants. First, nothing in the language of
the statute itself indicates that the legislature intended to exempt known and locatable mineral interest owners from the Act's
coverage. 5 Second, the intent of the Act,
as interpreted by the Indiana Supreme
Court, is broader than that suggested by
Polston in his article. The intent of the
Act, according to the court, is "to remedy
uncertainties in titles and to facilitate the
exploitation of energy sources and other
valuable mineral resources." Short v. Texaco, Inc., 273 Ind. at 526, 406 N.E.2d at
630-31. We agree with the district court
that the elimination of sta_le claims by identifiable, as well as unidentifiable, mineral
interest owners furthers the development
of mineral resources. Any owner who fails
to make an active use of his or her interest,
whether known or unknown, diminishes the
potential for the exploitation of mineral
resources.
[4] At oral argument, appellants styled
their contention that the Act should not
apply to them as a constitutional claim.
Regardless of whether we construe their
argument as an equal protection claim or
as a due process claim, their contention
lacks merit. Their equal protection claim
5. The Illinois legislature, by comparison, exempted known and locatable persons from cov-

fails for two reasons. First, the Act contains no classification scheme distinguishing between identifiable and unidentifiable
owners. Second, because the Act makes no
such distinction, appellants cannot prove
that they received disparate'treatment under the Act. Their due process claim fails
because the Supreme Court has already
declared, in a case in which the owners
were locatable, that the Act does not unconstitutionally deprive mineral interest
owners of due process by providing for an
automatic lapse of their interests, if unused, after twenty years. Texaco, Inc. v.
Short, 454 U.S. at 538, 102 S.Ct. at 796.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude
that appellants' mineral interest has lapsed.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district
court's order quieting title in appellee.

Vivian SPRYNCZYNATYK and Paul
Sprynczynatyk,
Appellees/Cross-Appellants,
v.

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Nos. 84-1566, 84-1611 .

-----------

.es Court of Appea~
Eighth Circuit.
Subm~
Decided Aug. 16, 1985.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc
Denied Sept. 17, 1985.
In automobile product liability and
negligence action, the United States District Court for the District of North Dakoerage under the Severed Mineral Interest Act.
Ill .Rev.Stat. ch. 96½ §§ 9201-9217 (1983).

......
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ta, John B. Jones, J ., entered judgment on
jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs, and cross
appeals were taken. The Court of Appeals,
Ross, Circuit Judge, held that admission of
videotapes of driver's hypnosis session during plaintiffs' case in chief without a proper cautionary instruction constituted prejudicial error.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Evidence e=:>359(6)
Generally, a videotape offered to prove
truth of matter asserted constitutes inadmissible hearsay. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule
80l(c), 28 U.S.C.A.
2. Federal Civil Procedure e=:>2173
Federal Courts e=:>896, 911
In automobile products liability action ,
trial court's limiting instruction concerning
videotapes of driver's hypnosis session,
which told jury that the tapes were being
received on ultimate issue of credibility of
driver's recall and that the purpose was to
permit jury to evaluate opinions they would
hear but which failed to warn against their
prohibited use to prove the truth of the
matters asserted on the tapes, was erroneous and insufficient to prevent prejudicial
use of the evidence; furthermore , under
the circumstances of the case, showing of
the videotapes of driver's hypnosis session,
without a proper cautionary instruction and
during plaintiffs' case in chief was highly
prejudicial to automobile manufacturer and
not harmless. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 105, 28
U.S.C.A.
3. Federal Courts e=:>638
Ordinarily a motion in limine does not
preserve error for appellate review.
4. Federal Courts e=:>638
In automobile product liability action,
automobile manufacturer's failure to object
during driver's direct examination to admission of driver's hypnotically enhanced testimony did not preclude appellate review of
the issue where trial court made a definitive pretrial ruling denying manufacturer's
motion in limine after the matter was fully
briefed and argued and, in denying motion

in limine, implicitly denied manufacturer's
alternative request that plaintiffs be required to establish before trial reliability of
driver's hypnotically enhanced testimony;
under the circumstances, requiring an objection when driver testified on grounds
raised in the motion in limine would have
been in the nature of a formal exception
and thus unnecessary. Fed.Rules Evid.
Rule 103(a)(l), 28 U.S.C.A.; Fed.Rules Civ.
Proc.Rule 46, 28 U.S.C.A.
5. Federal Courts e=:>416

In a federal court action, questions
such as burden of proof, presumptions,
competency and privileges are generally
questions of state law but issues of admissibility of evidence are questions of federal
law.
6. Witnesses e=:>257.10
District court, in cases where hypnosis
has been used, must conduct pretrial hearings on procedures used during the hypnotic session in question and assess effect of
hypnosis upon reliability of the testimony
before making a decision on admissibility
and proponent of the hypnotically enhanced
testimony has burden of proof during that
proceeding; additionally, district court
should consider whether and to what degree Hurd safeguards were followed when
making its determination that the hypnotically enhanced testimony is sufficiently reliable and court should also take into account the appropriateness of using hypnosis for the kind of memory loss involved,
and whether there is any evidence to corroborate the hypnotically enhanced testimony and must then determine whether, in
view of all the circumstances, proposed testimony is sufficiently reliable and whether
its probative value outweighs its prejudicial
effect, if any, to warrant admission.
7. Evidence e=:>150
Federal Courts e=:>823
Admissibility of evidence of experimental tests rests largely in discretion of trial
judge and his decision will not be overturned absent a clear showing of an abuse
of discretion.
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8. Federal Civil Procedure ~2011
In automobile products liability action,
trial court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding videotapes, pictures and summaries of tests which automobile manufacturer performed on the accident car where
such evidence would have been cumulative.
9. Products Liability ~83.5
Considering hypnotically enhanced testimony of driver, evidence in automobile
products liability and negligence action was
sufficient to support verdict in favor of
plaintiffs.
10. Federal Civil Procedure ~828
Federal Courts ~817
Disposition of a motion to amend is
within sound discretion of district court and
to warrant reversal there must be some
abuse of discretion.
11. Federal Civil Procedure ~840
In automobile product liability and
negligence action, trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion
to amend complaint to include a claim for
punitive damages on ground that the motion was untimely.
12. Federal Courts ~952
An amendment can be proper after
remand to district court even if the claim
had not been presented to district court in a
timely fashion .

Christine Hogan , Bismarck, N.D., for appellant/ cross-a ppe Bee.
Windle Turley, Dallas, Tex., for appellees/ cross-appellan_ts.
Before HEANEY, ROSS and FAGG, Circuit Judges.
ROSS, Circuit Judge.
Appellant and cross-appellee General Motors Corporation (GM) appeals from a final
judgment entered in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota
based upon a jury verdict in an automobile
product liability and negligence action
brought by appellees and cross-appellants,

Vivian Sprynczynatyk and her husband
Paul Sprynczynatyk (Sprynczynatyks or
plaintiffs).
The Sprynczynatyks were
awarded $5,025,000 in actual damages from
GM. We reverse andnemand with directions to the district court to conduct
further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
FACTS

On July 16, 1980, at approximately 8:00
p.m. a one car accident occurred on a gravel road near Bismarck, North Dakota.
Fourteen-year-old Rodney Sprynczynatyk
(Rodney) was driving the family-owned
1980 Chevrolet Citation X-car. Rodney,
who had obtained his learner's permit 2 or
3 weeks earlier, was accompanying his
mother, Vivian Sprynczynatyk (Vivian) on
some errands that evening. During the
return trip to their house, Vivian , who had
been driving, stopped and let Rodney drive
the car. Rodney had driven the Citation a
number of times before.
After Vivian turned the operation of the
car over to Rodney, he drove approximately
one mile on paved Highway 1804 and then
turned north onto a gravel road. As Rodney started down a hill (approximately 11 o/r
grade), he encountered difficulties controlling the car. At some point the car left the
road on the right (east) side, overturned,
and came to rest on its top with the front
of the car facing south. Vivian sustained
injuries which rendered her quadriplegic.
Vivian and her husband Paul filed this
action in district court against GM, the
manufacturer of the 1980 Citation. The
plaintiffs brought this action based upon
theories of negligence and strict liability.
They alleged that the Citation had either
defectively and unreasonably dangerous or
negligently designed brakes or both. The
Sprynczynatyks contended that the rear
brakes on the Citation locked causing the
car to spin around 180° and roll as it tipped
over into the east ditch. GM denied the
alleged brake defect and disputed plaintiffs' theory of how the accident occurred.
GM contended that Rodney did not apply
the brakes, and even if he did they didn 't
lock, but that Rodney merely panicked as a
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Vivian sought actual damages for her
personal injuries and Paul sought actual
damages for loss of consortium and lost
services. Two months before trial the
plaintiffs sought leave to amend their complaint to include a request for punitive
damages. Plaintiffs' motion was denied as
untimely .
Rodney was not a named party to the
lawsuit. The Sprynczynatyks' insurance
carrier had paid them $25,000, the policy
limits, and the Sprynczynatyks had executed a release in favor of the named insured, Paul, his "heirs" and "all others,"
which arguably ran to Rodney .
Prior to trial Rodney was hypnotized by
a trained psychologist, Dr. Robert Gordon,
at the request of the plaintiffs' counsel.
The hypnotic session was videotaped.
While hypnotized Rodney recalled applying
his right foot to the brakes as hard as he
could before the car spun and left the
gravel road. Prior to the hypnosis session,
Rodney's recollection was different . On
July 28, 1980, he gave a statement to an
insurance agent that he didn 't apply the
brakes at all, and during his September 16,
1982 deposition he testified that he could
have used the brakes· but his best recollection was that he did not apply them.
During the hypnotic session, after Dr.
Gordon put Rodney in a trance, he told
Rodney his mind could reach back and recollect things that he never thought were
possible. Dr. Gordon then led Rodney back
to the events of the day of the accident.
Rodney recounted his actions throughout
the day and th.e n what happened during the
accident. The two critical passages relating to his application of the brakes are as
follows:
RODNEY: I get back into the right
tracks and start going down and the car
went over to the left.
GORDON: It's going to the left?
RODNEY: Um-hum. And I see that I'm
gonna go in the ditch and hit the fence.

GORDON : You see you 're gonna hit it.
What are you going to do? Where is
your rig ht foot ?
RODNEY : On the brake.
GORDON : Where's your left foot?
RODNEY: Over the clutch.
GORDON: What are you doing with
your right foot and how much pressure
are you putting on titre brake?
RODNEY: Pushing.
GORDON : How hard?
RODNEY: Hard.
GORDON: As hard as you can?
RODNEY: Um-hum.
GORDON: Are you pumping it or pushing it?
RODNEY: No. I'm holding it steady.
GORDON: Holding it steady. What's
happening now?
RODNEY: Car is sliding.
GORDON: What are you going to do?
RODNEY: Screaming, the car turns
around .
GORDON: Where's your foot?
RODNEY: Still on the brake.

•

•

•

•

•

GORDON : What happens now?
RODNEY : The car spins all the way
around. I'm looking the other way.
GORDON: Where's your left foot?
RODNEY : Over the clutch now.
GORDON: Where's your right foot?
RODNEY: On the brake.
GORDON: What happens now?
RODNEY: I look over and I see the
ditch coming closer to me. I keep
screaming. I take my hands off the
wheel and I feel the car tipping and I put
them on the ceiling and shut my eyes .
GORDON: When do you shut your eyes ?
RODNEY: Right when the car is tipping
over. I feel it tipping. I put my hands
on the ceiling and .I close my eyes.
GORDON: Where are your feet?
RODNEY: On the floor.
After undergoing hypnosis, Rodney testified at his November 14, 1983 deposition
that he recalled applying the brakes hard
just before the car started to spin.
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GM filed a motion in limine to limit Rodney's trial testimony to his pre-hypnosis
statements or to require plaintiffs to establish the reliability of Rodney's post-hypnosis testimony prior to allowing him to testify at trial. The plaintiffs opposed the motion and after oral argument the district
court denied GM's motion in full.
The liability issues of the case were tried
to the jury first. As part of plaintiffs'
case-in-chief, following Vivian Sprynczynatyk's testimony, Dr. Gordon testified regarding Rodney's hypnosis session. During the direct examination of Dr. Gordon,
plaintiffs offered the videotapes of Rodney's hypnosis session as evidence and
sought to play the videotapes for the jury.
GM objected on the grounds that the tapes
were not admissible to prove the facts that
were recited on the tapes. The court overruled the objection at which time GM orally
requested that the court give a cautionary
instruction that the matters that were related on the tapes were not to be taken as
proof of the facts recited.1 The court gave
the following oral instruction:
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen,
the tapes that you are about to see are
being received on the issue of-the ultimate issue of the credibility of the recall
of the witness, Rodney Sprynczynatyk,
and we aren't here-the purpose of them
is to permit you to see it and you will be
receiving other evidence on this subject
both on the part of the plaintiff and
contrary evidence from the defendant.
And the purpose of viewing the tapes is
to permit you to evaluate the opinions
that you will subsequently hear.
The videotapes of the entire 56 minute hypnosis session were then viewed by the jury.
Rodney testified after Dr. Gordon without objection from GM. On direct examination Rodney testified that when the car
was going toward the left ditch he started
applying pressure to the brakes, the car
kept going and then he hit them all the way
and the car spun. On cross-examination
1. During the instruction conference GM requested a written cautionary instruction to the same

Rodney testified that he now remembered
things differently about the application of
the brakes during the course of the accident than he did before hypnosis.
As part of its defense GM pr-esented the
expert witness, Dr. Martin Orne, a leading
specialist in the field of hypnosis. Dr.
Orne testified in general to the unreliability
of hypnosis as a memory refresher and in
particular to the absence of certain procedural safeguards in Rodney's hypnosis.
Dr. Orne viewed Dr. Gordon's repeated
questions regarding the location of Rodney's feet in relation to the brakes as a
fatal flaw that was too suggestive and
opined that Rodney's "new memory" was a
creation of hypnosis and unlikely to be
true.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of
the Sprynczynatyks on both the strict liability and negligence counts. Following a
trial on the damages, the jury awarded
Vivian $4,500,000 and her husband Paul
$525,000. The trial court entered judgment
in accordance with the verdicts and denied
GM's post-trial motions.
GM then filed this appeal. For reversal
GM argues that the trial court erred 1) in
admitting the videotapes of Rodney's hypnosis session; 2) in admitting Rodney's
hypnotically enhanced testimony; 3) in excluding certain evidence of GM's post-crash
tests of the accident car; 4) in failing to
instruct on comparative fault; and 5) that
there was not substantial evidence to support the verdict.
The Sprynczynatyks cross-appeal, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion
when it denied them leave to amend their
complaint to include a claim for punitive
damages two months before trial. We discuss each of these issues in turn.
DISCUSSION
I. Admission of the Videotapes
The first issue we address is GM's contention that it was prejudicial and reversible error for the trial court to admit the
effect, which was also denied by the court.

r.::,:·;
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videotapes of Rodney's hypnosis session,
and to permit the jury to view them during
plaintiffs' case-in-chief without a specific
instruction warning against their prohibited use to prove the truth of the matters
asserted on the tapes. Plaintiffs contend
the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the videotapes because
they were admitted as a demonstrative aid
to help the jury understand the expert testimony about the hypnotic process. We
disagree.
[1] In general a videotape offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted constitutes inadmissible hearsay.
FED.R.
EVID. 80l(c). United States v. Dorrell,
758 F.2d 427, 434 (9th Cir.1985). In particular, courts have held that the contents of
actual hypnotic interviews are inadmissible
for the purpose of proving that the facts
recounted by the hypnotized witness actually occurred. State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d
138, 153 (N.D.1983) (en bane); State v.
Beachum, 643 P.2d 246, 254 (N.M .App.
1981). Thus a videotape is inadmissible as
evidence unless it comes within an exception to the hearsay rule, see, e.g., Grimes v.

Employers Mutual Liability Insurance
Co., 73 F.R.D. 607, 6U (D. Alaska 1977), or
unless it is offered for some other permissible purpose which would remove it from
the definition of hearsay.
When evidence can be admitted for one
purpose but cannot be admitted for some
other purpose, it has limited admissibility
and is governed by Rule 105 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Rule 105 provides in
relevant part that:
When evidence which is admissible • •
for one purpose but not admissible • • •
for another purpose is admitted, the
court, upon request, shall restrict the
evidence to its proper scope and instruct
the jury accordingly.
Rule 105 makes it the duty of the judge to
restrict the evidence to its proper scope and
entitles the opponent to a binding instruction that alerts the jury to the possibility of
the forbidden use and tells them not to use
it for that purpose. Since the videotapes of
Rodney's hypnosis session are inadmissible

to prove the truth of the matters asserted,
but arguably admissible for the purpose of
explaining the hypnotic procedure to the
jury, the question is whether the court's
limiting instruction was sufficient.

r
(2) In this case GM requested in the
presence of the jury a specific instruction
stating the prohibited use, namely, that the
videotapes were not offered to prove the
truth of the facts recounted. Instead of
adopting GM 's proffered instruction, the
district court told the jury that the tapes
were being received on the ultimate issue
of the credibility of Rodney's recall and
that the purpose was to permit the jury to
evaluate the opinions they would hear.
Having viewed the videotapes and having
reviewed the record in this case, we are
convinced that the instruction given before
the videotapes were shown was erroneous
and insufficient under Rule 105 to prevent
the prejudicial use of this evidence for the
following reasons.

First, the court's oral instruction told the
jury that the videotapes were being received on "the ultimate issue of the credibility of the recall of the witness, Rodney
• • • ." This was clear error in the sense
that the jury was directed to consider the
videotapes for the purpose of assessing
Rodney's credibility. Here the videotapes
were admitted as probative of the truth of
what Rodney said on those tapes and that
was error. Second, in the latter part of the
instruction the court stated the permissible
use of the tapes, namely for explanatory
purposes, but failed to warn of the prohibited use. The instruction did not "restrict
the scope" of the evidence. In fact, that
part of the court's instruction gave a negative signal to the jury when considered in
light of GM 's specific request that the videotapes not be considered as truth of the
matters asserted. By rejecting the prohibited use language as just articulated by
GM's counsel, and utilizing only permissible use language, the jury was improperly
led to think GM's proffered instruction was
incorrect. Although we do not hold that
Rule 105 requires all limiting instructions
to .contain the prohibited use language, we
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do state that in this case it was necessary
in light of GM's specifically worded proposed request that was made in the presence of the jury. The inference that GM 's
requested instruction was wrong, when
coupled with the erroneous issue-directing
statement at the beginning of the instruction, renders the district court's instruction
legally inadequate.2
Further, we find that under the circumstances of this case the showing of the
videotapes of Rodney's hypnosis session
without a proper cautionary instruction and
during plaintiffs' case-in-chief was highly
prejudicial to GM and not harmless. The
issue of whether Rodney ever applied the
brakes was central to the lawsuit and hotly
contested. It was on the videotapes that
the jury saw and heard Rodney, for the
first time, state that he applied the brakes
during the accident. The jury could not
reasonably be expected to disregard the
provocative nature of this inadmissible evidence and only consider what they saw as
an aid to understanding the process of hypnosis. Other relevant evidence was available to accomplish this didactic purpose.
In addition the jury could not reasonably be
expected to overlook the fact that the videotapes were shown during plaintiffs'
case-in-chief before GM ever challenged
Rodney's hypnosis session and hypnotic recall. Because of the insufficient limiting
instruction, the highly prejudicial nature,
and premature presentation of the evidence, we conclude the district court
abused its discretion in admitting the videotapes and that GM is entitled to a new trial.
Since this case must be retried, we turn
to the other issues which are likely to arise
anew, and upon which we feel compelled to
comment.

-

II.
I....

Admission of Hypnoticall~
ha.need T-est-i-mony--

The second hypnosis-related issue
presented in this case is whether the trial
2. If the district court determines on retrial that
the videotapes are admissible (see p. 1123 infra ), a legally adequate instruction would be:
The videotapes you are about to view are admitted for a limited purpose and you may not
consider them for any other purpose. The vi-

court erred, as GM contends, in admitting
Rodney's testimony at trial relating his
post-hypnosis recollection that he applied
the brakes during the accident.

,,,-

As a preliminary matter the court must
determine whether GM has preserved this
point for appellate review. The plaintiffs
contend that GM 's failure to object during
Rodney's direct examination precludes this
court's review because FED.R.EVID.
103(a)(l) requires a timely objection be
made in order to preserve an issue for
appeal. GM responds that the district
court's denial of its motion in limine was
sufficient to preserve the issues raised in
the motion.
[3, 4) Ordinarily in this circuit a motion
in limine does not preserve error for appellate review. Hale v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. , 756 F.2d 1322, 1333 (8th Cir.
1985). However, we find that requiring a
formal objection when Rodney took the witness stand at trial was not necessary under
the circumstances of this case for two reasons.
First, we adhere to the Third Circuit's
approach that Rule 103(a)(l) should be read
in tandem with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 46 which states that formal exceptions
are unnecessary and that the test is whether an objection at trial would have been
more in the nature of a formal exception or
in the nature of a timely objection calling
the court's attention to a matter it need
consider. American Home Assurance Co.
v. Sunshine Supermarket, Inc., 753 F.2d
321, 324 (3d Cir.1985). In the instant case
the district court made a definitive pre-trial
ruling that affected the entire course of the
trial. The district court's denial of the
motion was not made conditionally or with
the suggestion that the matter would be
reconsidered. It was not a typical motion
in limine situation where a hypothetical
deotapes are admitted for the sole purpose of
aiding you in your understanding of the hypnotic process. You are specifically cautioned to
avoid considering the videotapes as evidence of
the truth of the matters recounted on them.

-Jv
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question is posed whose nature and relevance is unclear before trial. The matter
was fully briefed and argued. Under these
circumstances requiring an objection when
Rodney testified on the grounds raised in
the motion in limine would have been in the
nature of a formal exception and thus unnecessary under FED.R.CIV .P. 46. Second, we note that when the district court
denied the motion in limine it implicitly
denied GM's alternative request that the
plaintiffs be required to establish before
trial the reliability of Rodney's hypnotically
enhanced testimony. There can be no
question that the propriety of refusing to
conduct such a preliminary hearing on the
reliability issue is squarely before this
court and is not contingent upon the making of any objection during the trial.
We now turn to the merits of the issue of
whether Rodney's hypnotically enhanced
testimony is admissible. Stated in general
terms, the issue is whether the testimony
of a witness who has undergone hypnosis
to refresh his or her recollection is admissible, and, if so, under what circumstances.
This question, previously undecided in this
circuit,3 has been the subject of much discussion and disagreement.~
Before discussing the various legal approaches to this question it will be helpful
to explain the phenomenon of hypnosis and
to note the problems it creates in the legal
context.
3. United States v. Harvey, 756 F.2d 636, 644-45
(8th Cir. 1985).

Hypnotism has been defined as "[t]he act
of inducing artificially a state of sleep or
trance in a subject • • • generally characterized by extreme responsiveness to suggestions from the hypnotist." 5 In a typical hypnotic session the h~notist leads the
subject to focus his or her attention, suspend critical judgment, follow the suggestions of the hypnotist, concentrate on a
past event and then recount the past event.
Hypnosis has been recognized by the
American Medical Association as a valid
therapeutic technique since 1958. 6 However, more recently hypnosis has been utilized for law enforcement investigative purposes in an attempt to aid witnesses and
victims to remember forgotten details regarding an event that is the subject of a
criminal or civil suit. It is when these
previously hypnotized victims or witnesses
take the stand to testify at trial that hypnosis becomes a legal issue. For although its
use is generally accepted as therapy, the
reliability of hypnosis as a truth-exacting
device is controversial.7
There are many problems inherent in the
hypnosis process that affect the degree in
which it can be, if ever, an accurate memory restorer. Hypnosis is characterized by
hypersuggestibility and hypercompliance of
the subject. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266,
1269 (1982); State v. Long, 32 Wash.App.
732, 649 P.2d 845, 848 (1982) (Swanson, J. ,
concurring). The hypnotist can consciously
5.

4. See, e.g. , Ruffra, Hypnotically Induced Testimony: Should It Be Admitted? 19 Crim.L.Bull.
293 (1983); Note, A Survey of Hypnotically Re-

freshed Testimony in Criminal Trials: Why Such
Evidence Should be Admitted in Iowa, 32 Drake
L.Rev. 749 (1982-83); Comment, Hypnosis: A
Primer for Admissability, 5 Gle ndale L.Rev. 51
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Hypn osis]; Note, Hypnotically Induced Testimony:
Credibility versus Admissibility, 57 Indiana L.J .
349 (1982); Note, The Admissibility of Testimony Influenced by Hypnosis, 67 Va.L.Rev. 1203
(I 98 I); and Note, Safeguards Against Suggestiveness: A Means For Admissibility of Hypno-lnduced Testimony, 38 Wash . & Lee L.Rev. 197
(I 981).

1119

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 668 (rev. 5th ed .
1979). We acknowledge that there is no single
genera lly accept ed theory of hypnosis, nor a
concensus :about a single d efiniti o n. See Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Association, "Scientific Status of Refreshing Recollection by the Use of Hypnosis" 253, The Journal of the American Medical Association 1918
(April 5, 1985) [here inafter cited as Council on
Scientific Affairs ]. We use th e definition for
discussion purposes only.

6. Council of Scientific Affairs, supra, note 4, at
1918. For example, psychologists and psychiatri sts use it to alleviate stress and doctors and
dentist s use it to control pain. Comment, Hyp nosis, supra, not e 3, at 57- 58.

7.

See Co mm ent , Hypnosis, supra, note 3, at 5158.
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or unconsciously lead the subject. "[A] person's memory. After hypnosis neither
hypnotized subject is highly susceptible to · the hypnotist nor the subject can distinsuggestion, even that which is subtle and guish between actual memories and those
unintended." State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d psuedo-memories confabulated under hyp764, 768 (Minn.1980). A second problem nosis. After hypnosis the subje<!!'has one
associated with hypnosis is that the hypno- memory of the past event, the hypnotic
tized witness may be influenced by the memory, and that becomes hardened in the
need to "fill in the gaps" in their memory, subject's mind. State v. Mack, supra, 292
N.W.2d at 769.
that is, to confabulate.
The hypnotic suggestion to relive a past
Thus the basic problem for the courts is
event, particularly when accompanied by that hypnosis does not insure the accuracy
questions about specific details, puts of the witness' recall. Quite often hypnopressure on the subject to provide infor- tized persons produce more information folmation for which few, if any, actual lowing hypnosis, but it may be accurate or
memories are available. This situation inaccurate and there is no scientific techmay jog the subject's memory and pro- nique that can reliably discriminate beduce some increased recall, but it will tween true or false details recounted duralso cause him to fill in .details that are ing hypnosis. 8
plausible but consist of memories or fanLargely because of the scientific uncertasies from other times. It is extremely tainty as to the reliability of hypnotic redifficult to know which aspects of hyp- call, courts have taken at least three differnotically aided recall are historically ac- ent approaches to the issue of the admissicurate and which aspects have been con- bility of testimony enhanced by hypnosis.
fabulated • • •.
Some jurisdictions allow such testimony to
State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86, go to the jury viewing hypnosis as affect92-93 (1981) (quoting Orne, The Use and ing credibility, not admissibility.9 Other
Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27 Int'] J. courts exclude such testimony as inadmissiClinical & Experimental Hypnosis 311 , 317- ble per se. 10 Another group of courts
318 (1979) ).
admit hypnotically induced testimony, but
Another concern over the use of hypnosis only if detailed procedural safeguards are
is the impact that it has on the hypnotized followed. 11
8. Council on Scientific Affairs, supra, note 4, at
1920.
9. See United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, 100 S.Ct. 179, 62
L.Ed.2d 116 (1979); United States v. Adams, 581
F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006,
99 S.Ct. 621, 58 L.Ed.2d 683 (1978); United
States v. Waksal, 539 F.Supp. 834 (S.D.Fla.1982),
rev'<! on other grounds, 709 F.2d 653 (11th Cir.
1983); United States v. Narciso, 446 F.Supp. 252
(E.D.Mich.1977). The following states have taken the same approach: Creamer v. State, 232
Ga. 136, 205 S.E.2d 240 (1974); State v. Wren,
425 So.2d 756 (La.1983); State v. Greer, 609
S.W.2d 423 (Mo.Ct.App.1980), vacated on other
grounds, 450 U.S. 1027, 101 S.Ct. 1735, 68
L.Ed.2d 222 (1981); State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d
138 (N.D.1983); State v. Glebock, 616 S.W.2d
897 (Tenn.Cr.App.1981); and Chapman v. State,
638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo.1982).

State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132
Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982) (en bane); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal.3d 18, 181 Cal.Rptr. 243,

10.

641 P.2d 775, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860, 103 S.Ct.
133, 74 L.Ed.2d 114 (1982); People v. Quintanar,
659 P.2d 710 (Colo.App.1982); Bundy v. State,
471 So.2d 9 (Fla.1985); Collins v. State, 52 Md.
App. 186, 447 A.2d 1272 (1982); People v. Gonzales, 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982);
State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (M inn .1980);
State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648
(1981); People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 466
N.Y.S.2d 255, 453 N.E.2d 484 (1983); State v.
Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 319 S.E.2d 177 (1984);
Com. v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170
(1981). Some of these courts do permit the
witness to testify with regard to those matters
which he or she was able to recall and relate
prior to hypnosis, or is substantially the same as
before hypnosis. See, e.g., State v. Seager, 341
N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 1983).
11. People v. Smrekar, 68 III.App.3d 379, 24 Ill.

Dec. 707, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979); State v. lwaki106 Idaho 618, 682 P.2d 571 (1984); State v.
Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981); State v.
Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (1981);
State v. Long, 32 Wash.App. 732, 649 P.2d 845
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The courts that automatically permit
hypnotically enhanced testimony view the
testimony as the witness' present recollection of events, refreshed by hypnosis, and
conclude that the witness is competent to
testify. State v. Brown, supra, 337
N.W.2d at 151; Chapman v. State, 638
P.2d 1280, 1282-84 (Wyo.1982). That the
witness' memory may have been impaired
by hypnosis or that suggestive material
may have been used to refresh his or her
recollection is considered to be a matter
affecting credibility, not admissibility. Id.
It is expected that cross-examination, expert testimony on the inherent risks of
hypnosis and cautionary instructions to the
jury will enable the jury to accurately assess the proper weight to be given to the
evidence. Id.
The second approach to determining admissibility adopted by some jurisdictions is
to apply the test of general acceptance by
the scientific community first enunciated in
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.
Cir.1923). In Frye the court stated that
the evidence relating to a scientific principle or discovery is a9missible when the
principle is established sufficiently to have
gained general acceptance in a particular
field . Id. at 1014. Courts that have followed this approach have imposed a per se
rule of inadmissibility to post-hypnotic testimony after finding that the process of
hypnosis is not generally accepted as reliable by the scientific community. See, e.g. ,
People v. Shirley, 31 Cal.3d 18, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 243, 641 P.2d 775, cert. denied, 459
U.S. 860, 103 S.Ct. 133, 74 L.Ed.2d 114
(1982); People v. Gonzales, 415 Mich. 615,
329 N.W.2d 743 (1982); and State v. Mack,
supra, 292 N.W.2d at 768. In general
these courts reviewed the scientific re(1982); State v. Armstrong, 110 Wi s.2d 555, 329
N.W.2d 386, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 946, 103 S.Ct.
2125, 77 L.Ed.2d 1304 (1983). Oregon has
adopted similar procedural requirements by
statute. OR.REV.STAT. § 136.675 (1981).
12. Those requirements are: (I) the hypnotist
must be a qualified psychiatrist or psychologist
who has experience in the use of hypnosis; (2)
the hypnotist should be working independently
of either side involved in the litigat ion; (3) all

search on hypnosis, focused on the prob)ems inherent in it as an accurate memory
restorer and concluded that hypnosis has
not received sufficient general acceptance
in the scientific communrty to give reasonable assurance that the results produced
will be sufficiently reliable to outweigh the
risks of abuse or prejudice. People v. Gonzales, supra, 329 N.W.2d at 748.
As an example, in State v. Mack, supra,
the court held that the results of hypnosis
used to produce hypnotically induced
"memory," like the results of mechanical
or scientific testing, are not admissible unless the testing has developed or improved
to the point where experts in the field
widely share the view that the results are
scientifically reliable as accurate. Id. at
768.
The third line of authority allows for the
admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony if certain safeguards are followed to
insure the reliability of the testimony. The
leading proponent of this "procedural safeguard" approach has been the Supreme
Court of New Jersey as articulated in State
v. Hurd, supra. In Hurd the court held
hypnotically induced testimony was admissible if the proponent of the testimony
could demonstrate that the use of hypnosis
in the particular case was a reasonably
reliable means of restoring memory comparable to normal recall in its accuracy. The
New Jersey court also held that in reviewing admissibility of hypnotically refreshed
testimony, the trial court should evaluate
the kind of memory loss that hypnosis was
used to restore and the specific technique
employed, based on the expert testimony
presented by the parties. The court also
laid down specific requirements 12 which
must be met before a party may introduce
the information given to the hypnotist prior to
the hypnosis session must be recorded; (4) the
subject must describe the facts to the hypnotist
as he remembers them before hypnosis; (5) all
contact between the hypnotist and the witness
must be recorded, preferably on videotape; and
(6) no person besides the hypnotist and the
subject should be present during any contact
between the two. State v. Hurd, supra, 432 A.2d
at 89-90. These safeguards were first proposedby Dr. Martin Orne, GM's expert.
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hypnotically refreshed testimony in a criminal trial. Therefore under the "procedural
safeguard" approach the testimony may or
may not be admissible depending upon the
trial court's determination whether such
testimony is reliable under the particular
circumstances.
The Fifth Circuit has recently followed
an approach similar in effect to the Hurd
approach. In United States v. Valdez, 722
F.2d 1196 (5th Cir.1984) the court held that
post-hypnosis testimony may or may not be
admissible under FED.R.EVID. 403.13 Although the Valdez court held in that particular case that post-hypnosis testimony in
which a hypnotized witness identifies for
the first time a person he knew was al. ready under suspicion is inadmissible in a
criminal trial, the court stated that if adequate procedural safeguards have been followed, corroborated post-hypnotic testimony might be admissible if the probative
value of the testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect. Id. at 1203.
[5] In the instant case the district court
permitted Rodney to testify as to his posthypnotic memory because North Dakota is
one of the jurisdictions which has held that
hypnosis affects credibility ~ut not admissibility. See State v. Brown, supra, 337
N.W.2d at 151. Federal courts are not
bound by state law on this issue. Questions such as burden of proof, presumptions, competency, and privileges are generally questions of state law, but issues of
admissibility of evidence are questions of
federal law. Warner v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 739 F.2d 1347, 1351 n. 6 (8th
Cir.1984); Sturm v. Clark Equipment Co.,
547 F.Supp. 144, 145 (W.D.Mo.1982), aff'd,
732 F.2d 161 (8th Cir.1984). Quite simply,
we do not view this issue as a competency
question but as an evidentiary problem
within the control of the district court and
governed by federal law. See United
States v. Valdez, supra, 722 F.2d at 1201.
GM urges this court to follow the Frye
approach and in essence establish a per se
13. A similar approach was adopted by the Court
of Appeals of Alaska. State v. Contreras, 674

inadmissibility rule or to adopt the " procedural safeguard" approach. Plaintiffs, on
the other hand, advocate the credibility approach which is, for all practical purposes,
a per se rule of admissibility of such evidence. We are reluctant to-establish a per
se rule of inadmissibility or admissibility
and we decline to do so.
A per se rule would remove the question
from the discretionary realm of the district
court. If we were to establish a per se rule
of inadmissibility, relevant, reliable testimony would in some instances be automatically disallowed and would hamper the
truthfinding function of our system. A
rule of per se inadmissibility is impermissibly broad and may result in the exclusion
of valuable and accurate evidence in some
cases. See State v. Hurd, supra, 432 A.2d
at 94; State v. Beachum, supra, 643 P.2d
at 252. On the other hand, if we adopt a
per se rule of admissibility, in some circumstances, evidence that was unreliable because of the methods used in hypnosis and
prejudicial because the jury may be overly
influenced by testimony obtained from hypnotic recall would be admitted and that too
would have an undesirable effect on our
judicial system. State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 618, 682 P.2d 571, 577 (1984). A per se
rule of admissibility does not cure the risks
of undue prejudice and jury confusion. Accordingly, we adopt a flexible rule on the
admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony that enables the district court to determine the question on a case-by-case basis. We are satisfied that, if the hypnosis
session is properly conducted in appropriate cases, the hypnotically enhanced testimony does not run afoul of the Frye test to
the extent it is applicable.
[6] We adopt a rule which requires the
district court, in cases where hypnosis has
been used, to conduct pretrial hearings on
the procedures used during the hypnotic
session in question and assess the effect of
hypnosis upon the reliability of the testimony before making a decision on admissibiliP.2d 792 (Alaska App. I 983).
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ty. The proponent of the hypnotically en- and confabulation, but also allow for the
hanced testimony bears the burden of inclusion of reliable refreshed memory
proof during this proceeding. In addition, which hypnosis can at times under certain
we adopt a version of the Hurd safe- circumstances produ<r In sum, we hold
guards 1~ to the extent that the district that the district court should, before trial,
court should consider whether and to what scrutinize the circumstances surrounding
degree the safeguards were followed when the hypnosis session, consider whether the
making its determination that the hypnoti- safeguards we have approved were folcally enhanced testimony is sufficiently re- lowed and determine in light of all the
15
liable.
Other factors the district court circumstances if the proposed hypnotically
should take into account are the appropri- enhanced testimony is sufficiently reliable
ateness of using hypnosis for the kind of and not overly prejudicial to be admitted.
memory loss involved, and whether there is
Upon retrial of this case, the district
any evidence to corroborate the hypnoticalcourt
should determine before trial the adly enhanced testimony. The district court
missibility
of Rodney's hypnotically enmust then determine whether in view of all
the circumstances, the proposed testimony hanced testimony using the approach set
is sufficiently reliable and whether its pro- forth in our discussion. In the event the
bative value outweighs its prejudicial ef- district court finds that as a result of the
fect, if any, to warrant admission. Ulti- hypnotic session Rodney's testimony on the
mately the district court must decide application of the brakes has been tainted,
whether the risk that the testimony re- by suggestion or confabulation, and is
flects a distorted memory is so great that unreliable, Rodney will not be permitted to
the p;obative value of the testimony is testify as to that matter based upon his
post-hypnosis
recollection.
However,
destroyed.
is
rlear
that
other
parts
of his
where
it
By our ruling today we place this hypnomemory
of
the
events
of
the
accident
were
sis evidentiary problem directly within the
present
before
hypnosis,
and
remain
unconcontrol of the district court. We think the
better approach is for the district court and taminated by hypnosis, the court can deternot the jury to make the preliminary deter- mine that Rodney may testify as to those
mination of admissibility as is the case with events. See State v. Seager, 341 N.W.2d
other evidentiary questions. See FED.R. 420 (Iowa 1983).
EVID. 104(a). It is our hope that this
case-by-case method of determining the admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony will guard against the problems of
hypnosis, especially undue suggestiveness

In the event that the trial court finds
that Rodney's post-hypnosis testimony is
reliable and that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, Rodney will be
permitted to testify to his present recollec-

(1) The hypnotic session should be conducted by an impartial licensed psychiatrist or psychologist trained in the use of hypnosis and thus
aware of its possible effects on memory so as to
aid in the prevention of improper suggestions
and confabulation. Appointment of the psychiatrist or psychologist should first be approved
by the trial court. (Since this would be impossible in this case the trial court should not give
controlling weight to the failure to secure court
approval in the retrial of this matter.) (2) Information given to the hypnotist by either party
concerning the case should be noted, preferably
in written form, so that the extent of information the subject received from the hypnotist may
be determined. (3) Before hypnosis, the hypnotist should obtain a detailed description of the
facts from the subj'ect, avoiding adding new

elements to the subject's description. (4) The
session should be recorded so a permanent
record is available to ensure against suggestive
procedures. Videotape is a preferable method
of recordation. (5) Preferably, only the hypnotist and subject should be present during any
phase of the hypnotic session, but other persons
should be allowed to attend if their attendance
can be shown to be essential and steps are taken
to prevent their influencing the results of the
session.

14.

In adopting this approach we do not hold
that if the safeguards were followed the testimony is always admissible, nor do we interpret the
rule to mean that if some of the safeguards were
not followed the testimony is never admissible.

15.
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tion without reference to the fact of hypnosis. Plaintiffs will not present evidence of
his hypnosis in their direct case-in-chief. If
GM wishes to impeach Rodney's testimony
because he was hypnotized, it may crossexamine concerning the hypnosis and both
parties may then bring in experts to testify
to the problems and benefits of hypnosis as
rebuttal to the other party's assertions.
Then and only then would the videotapes of
the actual hypnosis session be considered
for possible admission, subject to the district court's Rule 403 balancing test and if
deemed more probative than prejudicial,
subject to a limiting instruction as discussed in Part I supra.

III. Exclusion of Videotapes, Photographs, and Summaries of Postcrash Tests

GM also argues that the district court
abused its discretion when it excluded videotapes, pictures and summaries of the
tests it performed on the accident car in
1983. The court permitted GM's witnesses
Newsock and McCarthy to talk about the
tests, but the court excluded videotapes,
photographs and summaries because they
would not have been particularly helpful,
would have been cumulative, and possibly
prejudicial.

IV.

Instructions
Fault

on

GM also contends that the district colllt'
committed reversible _error when it failed to
instruct on comparative fault on either U..
strict liability or negligence counts. Sinet
this case was tried )he Supreme Court of
North Dakota has decided at least fo11r
cases which have some bearing on t.bia
issue. See Mauch v. Manufacturers Sal.,
& Service, Inc. , 345 N.W.2d 338 (N
1984); Day v. General Motors Corp.,
N.W.2d 349 (N.D.1984); Andersen

Teamsters Local 116 Building Club, li
347 N.W.2d 309 (N.D.1984); and Kau,
v. Meditec, Inc., 353 N.W.2d 297
1984). Because of these ne\\'. cases and
decision to remand for a new trial on
grounds, we need not decide whe
was error for the district court to ref1
instruct on comparative fault. Ho·
upon retrial, the district court is
reconsider its previous decision in lipt
the above cases.
V.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

As a final assignment of error G
serts that there was not substantial
dence to support the verdict. 16 G)( ·
tains that plaintiffs' theory of the
is a collection of false premises
with the physical facts and that
dent could not have occurred the
tiffs contend whether or not
plied the brakes. Thus for pu
discussion of this issue GM's a
verdict is two-fold. First, GM
that without Rodney's testimony
applied the brakes, there was in,:
evidence to support plaintiffs'
rear brake design defect cauaed
dent. Second, GM argues that
Rodney's testimony that he
brakes, there was insufficient
support plaintiffs' theory that a
design defect caused the accid,

(7, 8) The admissibility of evidence of
experimental tests rests largely in the discretion of the trial judge and his decision
will not be overturned absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Hale _v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. , supra, 756
F.2d at 1333; Randall v. Warnaco, Inc.,
677 F.2d 1226, 1233 (8th Cir.1982). We
have read the testimony of GM's experts
who fully described the tests and results
and find that the tapes, photographs and
summaries would, indeed, have been cumulative. We find no abuse of discretion in
the district court's decision to exclude this
series of cumulative evidence under those
circumstances. See Borough v. Duluth,
Missabe & Iron Range Railway Co., 762
In view of our decision to
F.2d 66, 70 (8th Cir.1985).
videotape issue and to leave tc>
16. We construe GM's argument to be that the
district court erred in denying its motions for

Cornparau,.

directed verdict and judgment
the verdict or new trial.

SERIES

SPRYNCZYNATYK v. GENERAL MOTORS CORP.
Cite as 771 F.2d I 112 (1985)

:ructions
It

on

contends that the district
•eversible error when it failed
comparative fault on eithe~
:y or negligence counts. S
!lS tried the Supreme Court
>ta has decided at least
1 have some bearing -011

'dauch v. Manufacturers
Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338
v. General Motors Corp.,
➔ (N.D.1984); And,
,ocal 116 Building Club,
~09 (N.D.1984); and Ka
Inc., 353 N.W.2d 297
1se of these new cases
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. previous decision in
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court, upon retrial , the question of whether
}todney's hypnotically enhanced testimony
ii admissible, we need not determine ·the
hYJ>Othetical question of whether the evidence, without Rodney's post-hypnosis recollection, is sufficient to support the verdict· Consequently we do not address
G)f's argument that there is not substanevidence to support the verdict without
JlOdney's hypnotically enhanced testimony.
fo do so would be premature and, perhaps,
essary speculation on our part.

VI.
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Punitive Damages Claim

(10-12] Plaintiffs' only issue on crossappeal is their contention that the trial
court erred in refusing to allow an amendment to the complai'!,t, to include a claim
against GM for punitive damages. The
disposition of a motion to amend is within
the sound discretion of the district court
and to warrant reversal there must be
some abuse of discretion. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9
L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). In this case the district
court denied the motion mainly because it
J As for our assessment of the evi- was untimely in the sense, we assume, that
that was presented to the jury in this it would have been disruptive to the trial
we hold that there was substantial schedule and potentially prejudicial to GM.
.ce from which the jury could infer We find no abuse of discretion in that
the accident occurred in the manner ruling. However on retrial the district
ted by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' the- court's rationale for refusing the amendthat Rodney applied the brakes, ment is no longer as strong a consideration.
,e rear brakes locked before the front So, while we see no abuse of discretion in
causing the car to spin 180° on the the previous ruling, we direct the district
d then roll off and flip into the court to reconsider the amendment on reThe following evidence was before trial. "An amendment can be proper after
: (1) Vivian's testimony that the car remand to the district court even if the
'ore it left the road; (2) Rodney's claim • • • had not been presented to the
; (3) accident reconstructionist district court in a timely fashion. " City of
opinion based on the physical dam- Columbia v. Paul N Howard Co., 707
car that the car swapped ends F.2d 338, 341 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, left the road and that the spin U.S. - , 104 S.Ct. 238, 78 L.Ed.2d 229
(1983) (citations omitted).
a result of an application of the
,ch caused the rear wheels to CONCLUSION
,mentarily; and (4) expert witWe conclude that the admission of the
• opinion based on the position
videotapes
of Rodney's hypnosis session
that the rear wheels on the
. . Admittedly GM proffered during plaintiffs' case-in-chief without a
contrary, but in considering proper cautionary instruction constituted
prejudicial error. Accordingly we reverse
of this evidence we must
and remand for a new trial at which time
which the plaintiffs' evithe district court is directed to conduct
prove and all reasonable
pretrial proceedings consistent with this
y deducible from the facts
opinion to determine the admissibility of
in the plaintiffs' favor.
Rodney's hypnotically enhanced testimony
J,.,i.nes, Inc. v. Anderson and to consider plaintiffs' request to amend
145, F.2d 1188, 1192 (8th their complaint to include a claim for puni-

Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v.
9, 11 (8th Cir.1965).
of review we cannot
supporting the jury's
,...,ffs was not substan-

tive damages.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 86-130

VICKIE LORENE ROCK, PETITIONER v. ARKANSAS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF ARKANSAS
[June-, 1987]

JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented in this case is whether Arkansas' evidentiary rule prohibiting the admission of hypnotically refre~
y violated petitio~
t to
testify on her own behalf as a defendant in a criminal case.
I
Petitioner Vickie Lorene Rock was charged with manslaughter in the July 2, 1983, death of her husband, Frank
Rock. A dispute had been simmering about Frank's wish to
move from the couple's small apartment adjacent to Vickie's
beauty parlor to a trailer she owned outside town. That
night a fight erupted when Frank refused to let petitioner eat
some pizza and prevented her from leaving the apartment to
get something else to eat. App. 98, 103-104. When police
arrived on the scene they found Frank on the floor with a bullet wound in his chest. Petitioner urged the officers to help
her husband, Tr. 230, and cried to a sergeant who took her in
charge, "please save him" and "don't let him die." Id., at
268. The police removed her from the building because she
was upset and because she interfered with their investigation
by her repeated attempts to use the telephone to call her husband's parents. Id., at 263-264, 267-268. According to the
testimony of one of the investigating officers, petitioner told
him that "she stood up to leave the room and [her husband]
grabbed her by the throat and choked her and threw her
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against the wall and . . . at that time she walked over and
picked up the weapon and pointed it toward the floor and he
hit her again and she shot him." Id., at 281. 1
Because petitioner could not remember the precise details
of the shooting, her attorney suggested that she submit to
hypnosis in order to refresh her memory. Petitioner was
hypnotized twice by Doctor Betty Back, a licensed neuropsychologist with training in the field of hypnosis. Id., at
901-903. Doctor Back interviewed petitioner for an hour
prior to the first hypnosis session, taking notes on petitioner's general history and her recollections of the shooting.
App. 46-47. 2 Both hypnosis sessions were recorded on
tape. Id., at 53. Petitioner did not relate any new information during either of the sessions, id., at 78, 83, but, after the
hypnosis, she was able to remember that at the time of the
incident she had her thumb on the hammer of the gun, but
had not held her finger on the trigger. She also recalled that
'Another officer reported a slightly different version of the events:
"She stated that she had told her husband that she was going to go outside.
He refused to let her leave and grabbed her by the throat and began choking her. They struggled for a moment and she grabbed a gun. She told
him to leave her alone and he hit her at which time the gun went off. She
stated that it was an accident and she didn't mean to shoot him. She said
she had to get to the hospital and talk to him." Tr. 388.
See also id., at 301-304, 337-338; App. 3-10.
2
Doctor Back's handwritten notes regarding petitioner's memory of the
day of the shooting read as follows:
"Pt states she & hush. were discussing moving out to a trailer she had
prev. owned. He was 'set on' moving out to the trailer-she felt they
should discuss. She bec[ame] upset & went to another room to lay down.
Bro. came & left. She came out to eat some of the pizza, he wouldn't allow
her to have any. She said she would go out and get [something] to eat he
wouldn't allow her-He pushed her against a wall an end table in the corner [with] a gun on it. They were the night watchmen for business that sets
behind them. She picked gun up stated she didn't want him hitting her
anymore. He wouldn't let her out door, slammed door & 'gun went off &
he fell & he died' [pt looked misty eyed here-near tears]" (additions by
Doctor Back). App. 40.
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the gun had discharged when her husband grabbed her arm
during the scuffle. Id., at 29, 38. As a result of the details
that petitioner was able to remember about the shooting, her
counsel arranged for a gun expert to examine the handgun, a
single action Hawes .22 Deputy Marshal. That inspection
revealed that the gun was defective and prone to fire, when
hit or dropped, without the trigger's being pulled. Tr.
662- 663, 711.
When the prosecutor learned of the hypnosis sessions, he
filed a motion to exclude petitioner's testimony. The trial
judge held a pretrial hearing on the motion and concluded
that no hypnotically refreshed testimony would be admitted.
The court issued an order limiting petitioner's testimony to
"matters remembered and stated to the examiner prior to
being placed under hypnosis." App. to Pet. for Cert. xvii. 3
At trial, petitioner introduced testimony by the gun expert,
The full pretrial order reads as follows :
"NOW on this 26th day of November, 1984, comes on the captioned matter for pre-trial hearing, and the Court finds:
"l. On September 27 and 28, 1984, Defendant was placed under hypnotic
trance by Dr. Bettye Back, PhD, Fayetteville, Arkansas, for the express
purpose of enhancing her memory of the events of July 2, 1983, involving
the death of Frank Rock.
"2. Dr. Back was professionally qualified to administer hypnosis. She
was objective in the application of the technique and did not suggest by
leading questions the responses expected to be made by Defendant. She
was employed on an independent, professional basis. She made written
notes of facts related to her by Defendant during the pre-hypnotic interview. She did employ post-hypnotic suggestion with Defendant. No one
else was present during any phase of the hypnosis sessions except Dr. Back
and Defendant.
"3. Defendant cannot be prevented by the Court from testifying at her
trial on criminal charges under the Arkansas Constitution, but testimony
of matters recalled by Defendant due to hypnosis will be excluded because
of inherent unreliability and the effect of hypnosis in eliminating any meaningful cross-examination on those matters. Defendant may testify to matters remembered and stated to the examiner prior to being placed under
hypnosis. Testimony resulting from post-hypnotic suggestion will be
excluded." App. to Pet. for Cert. xvii.
3
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Tr. 647-712, but the court limited petitioner's own description of the events on the day of the shooting to a reiteration of
the sketchy information in Doctor Back's notes. See App.
96-104. 4 The jury convicted petitioner on the manslaughter
charge and she was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment and
a $10,000 fine.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas rejected petitioner's claim that the limitations on her testimony violated
her right to present her defense. The court concluded that
"the dangers of admitting this kind of testimony outweigh
whatever probative value it may have," and decided to follow
the approach of States that have held hypnotically refreshed
testimony of witnesses inadmissible per se. Rock v. State,
288 Ark. 566, 573, 708 S. W. 2d 78, 81 (1986). Although the
court acknowledged that "a defendant's right to testify is fundamental," id., at 578, 708 S. W. 2d, at 84, it ruled that the
exclusion of petitioner's testimony did not violate her constitutional rights. Any "prejudice or deprivation" she suffered "was minimal and resulted from her own actions and
not by any erroneous ruling of the court." Id., at 580, 708
S. W. 2d, at 86. We granted certiorari, - - U. S. - ' When petitioner began to testify she was repeatedly interrupted by
the prosecutor, who objected that her statements fell outside the scope of
the pretrial order. Each time she attempted to describe an event on the
day of the shooting, she was unable to proceed for more than a few words
before her testimony was ruled inadmissible. For example, she was unable to testify without objection about her husband's activities on the
morning of the shooting, App. 11, about their discussion and disagreement
concerning the move to her trailer, i d. , at 12, 14, about her husband's and
his brother's replacing the shock absorbers on a van, i d. , at 16, and about
her brother-in-law's return to eat pizza, i d. , at 19-20. She then made a
proffer, outside the hearing of the jury, of testimony about the fight in an
attempt to show that she could adhere to the court's order. The prosecution objected to every detail not expressly described in Doctor Back's notes
or in the testimony the doctor gave at the pretrial hearing. Id. , at 32-35.
The court agreed with the prosecutor's statement that "ninety-nine percent of everything [petitioner] testified to in the proffer" was inadmissible.
Id., at 35.

4
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(1986), to consider the constitutionality of Arkansas' per se
rule excluding a criminal defendant's hypnotically refreshed
testimony.

II
Petitioner's claim that her testimony was impermissibly excluded is bottomed on her constitutional right to testify in her
own defense. At this point in the development of our adversary system, it cannot be doubted that a defendant in a criminal case has the right to take the witness stand and to testify
in his or her own defense. This, of course, is a change from
the historic common-law view, which was that all parties to
litigation, including criminal defendants, were disqualified
from testifying because of their interest in the outcome of the
trial. See generally 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 576, 579 (J.
Chadbourn rev. 1979). The principal rationale for this rule
was the possible untrustworthiness of a party's testimony.
Under the common law, the practice did develop of permitting criminal defendants to tell their side of the story, but
they were limited to making an unsworn statement that could
not be elicited through direct examination by counsel and was
not subject to cross-examination. Id., at § 579, p. 827.
This Court in F erguson v. Georgia, 365 U. S. 570, 573-582
(1961), detailed the history of the transition from a rule of a
defendant's incompetency to a rule of competency. As the
Court there recounted, it came to be recognized that permitting a defendant to testify advances both the "'detection of
guilt"' and "'the protection of innocence,"' i d., at 581, quoting 1 Am. L. Rev. 396 (1867), and by the end of the seconq
half of the 19th century,5 all States except Georgia had en5

The removal of the disqualifications for accused persons occurred later
than the establishment of the competence to testify of civil parties. 2 J .
Wigmore § 579, p. 826 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1979). This was not due to concern that criminal defendants were more likely to be unreliable than other
witnesses, but to a concern for the accused:
"If, being competent, he failed to testify, that (it was believed) would dam-age his cause more seriously than if he were able to claim that his silence

-

86-130---OPINION
6

ROCK v. ARKANSAS

acted statutes that declared criminal defendants competent
to testify. See id., at 577 and n. 6, 596-598. 6 Congress
enacted a general competency statute in the Act of Mar. 16,
1878, 20 Stat. 30, as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 3481, and similar
developments followed in other common-law countries.
Thus, more than 25 years ago this Court was able to state:
"In sum, decades ago the considered consensus of the
English-speaking world came to be that there was no rational justification for prohibiting the sworn testimony of
the accused, who above all others may be in a position to
meet the prosecution's case." Fergu son v. Georgia, 365
U. S., at 582. 7
The right to testify on one's own behalf at a criminal trial
has sources in several provisions of the Constitution. It is
one of the rights that "are essential to due process of law in a
fair adversary process." Faretta v. California, 422 U. S.
806, 819, n. 15 (1975). The necessary ingredients of the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no one shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law include a right to
be heard and to offer testimony:
were enforced by law. Moreover, if he did testify, that (it was believed)
would injure more than assist his cause, since by undergoing the ordeal of
cross-examination, he would appear at a disadvantage dangerous even to
an innocent man." Id., at-828.
6
The Arkansas Constitution guarantees an accused the right "to be
heard by himself and his counsel." Art. 2, § 10. Rule 601 of the Arkansas
Rules of Evidence provides a general rule of competency: "Every person is
competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules."
1
Ferguson v. Georgia , 365 U. S. 570 (1961), struck down as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment a Georgia statute that limited a
defendant's presentation at trial to an unsworn statement, insofar as it denied the accused "the right to have his counsel question him to elicit his
statement. " Id. , at 596. The Court declined to reach the question of a
defendant's constitutional right to testify, because the case did not involve
a challenge to the particular Georgia statute that rendered a defendant
incompetent to testify. Id., at 572, n. 1. Two Justices, however, urged
that such a right be recognized explicitly. Id., at 600-601 , 602 (concurring
opinions).

f
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"A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against
him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a
right to his day in court-are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a
right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel." In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 273 (1948) (emphasis added). 8
See also Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U. S., at 602 (Clark, J.,
concurring) (Fourteenth Amendment secures "right of a
criminal defendant to choose between silence and testifying
in his own behalf"). 9
The right to testify is also found in the Compulsory Process
Clause oft1ieSixtli' Amendment, which grants a defendant
the right to call "witnesses in his favor," a right that is guaranteed in the criminal courts of the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 17-19
(1967). Logically included in the accused's ri ht to call witnesses whose testimony is ' material and favorable to his defense," United State-s v. a enzuela-Bernal, 458 U. S. 858,
867 (1982), is a right to testify himself, should he decide it is
in his favor to do so. In fact, the most important witness for
the defense in many criminal cases is the defendant himself.
There is no justification today for a rule that denies an accused the opportunity to offer his own testimony. Like the
truthfulness of other witnesses, the defendant's veracity,
8

Before F erguson v. Georgia, it might have been argued that a defendant's ability to present an unsworn statement would satisfy this right.
Once that procedure was eliminated, however, there was no longer any
doubt that the right to be heard, which is so essential to due process in an
adversary system of adjudication, could be vindicated only by affording a
defendant an opportunity to testify before the factfinder.
9
This right reaches beyond the criminal trial: the procedural due process constitutionally required in some extra-judicial proceedings includes
the right of the affected person to testify. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U. S. 778, 782, 786 (1973) (probation revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U. S. 471, 489 (1972) (parole revocation); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S.
254, 269 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits).

I
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which was the concern behind the original common-law rule,
can be tested adequately by cross-examination. See generally Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich. L.
Rev. 71, 119-120 (1974).
Moreover, in Faretta v. California, 422 U. S., at 819, the
Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment
"grants to the accused personally the right to make his
defense. It is the accused, not counsel, who must be 'informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,' who
must be 'confronted with the witnesses against him,' and
who must be accorded 'compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor.'" (Emphasis added.)
Even more fundamental to a personal defense than is the
right of self-representation, which was found to be "necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment," ibid, is an
accused's right to present his own version of events in his
own words. A defendant's opportunity to conduct his own
defense by calling witnesses is incomplete if he may not
present himself as a witness.
The opportunity to testify is also a necessary corollary to
the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compelled testimony. In Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971), the
Court stated: "Every criminal defendant is privileged to
testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so." Id., at 225.
Three of the dissenting Justices in that case agreed that the
Fifth Amendment encompasses this right: "[The Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination] is fulfilled
only when an accused is guaranteed the right 'to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of
his own will.' ... The choice of whether to testify in one's
own defense . . . is an exercise of the constitutional privilege." Id., at 230 (emphasis removed) , quoting Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 8 (1964). 10
On numerous occasions the Court has proceeded on the premise that
the right to testify on one's own behalf in defense to a criminal charge is a
10
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III
question'.now before the Court is whether a criminal
d e f e n d ~ to ·testify may be restricted by a state rule
that excludes er post- ypnos1s testimony. This is no
e
first time this Court as face a constitu ional challenge to a
state rule, designed to ensure trustworthy evidence, that interfered with the ability of a defendant to offer testimony.
In Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14 (1967), the Court was
confronted with a state statute that prevented persons
charged as principals, accomplices, or accessories in the same
crime from being introduced as witnesses for one another.
The statute, like the original common-law prohibition on testimony by the accused, was grounded in a concern for the
reliability of evidence presented by an interested party:
"It was thought that if two persons charged with the
same crime were allowed to testify on behalf of each
other, 'each would try to swear the other out of the
charge.' This rule, as well as the other disqualifications
for interest, rested on the unstated premises that the
right to present witnesses was subordinate to the court's
interest in preventing perjury, and that erroneous decisions were best avoided by preventing the jury from
hearing any testimony that might be perjured, even if it
were the only testimony available on a crucial issue."
(Footnote omitted.) Id., at 21, quoting Benson v.
United States, 146 U. S. 325, 335 (1892).
-

\

As the Court recognized, the incompetency of a codefendant to testify had been rejected on nonconstitutional
fundamental constitutional right. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, - - U. S.
- - (1986) (slip op. 5); id. , at--, n. 5 (slip op. 9, n. 5) (BLACKMUN, J.,
opinion concurring in the judgment); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U. S. 745, 751
(1983) (defendant has the "ultimate authority to make certain fundamental
decisions regarding the case, as to whether to ... testify in his or her own
behalf"); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U. S. 605, 612 (1972) ("Whether the
defendant is to testify is an important tactical decision as well as a matter
of constitutional right").
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grounds in 1918, when the Court, refusing to be bound by
"the dead hand of the common-law rule of 1789," stated:
"'[T]he conviction of our time [is] that the truth is more
likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony of all
persons of competent understanding who may seem to
have knowledge of the facts involved in a case, leaving
the credit and weight of such testimony to be determined
by the jury or by the court . . .. '" Id, at 22, quoting
Rosen v. United States, 245 U. S. 467, 471 (1918).
The Court concluded that this reasoning was compelled by
the Sixth Amendment's protections for the accused. In particular, the Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment was
designed in part "to make the testimony of a defendant's witnesses admissible on his behalf in court." Ibid.
With the rationale for the common-law incompetency rule
thus rejected on constitutional grounds, the Court found that
the mere presence of the witness in the courtroom was not
enough to satisfy the Constitution's Compulsory Process
Clause. By preventing the defendant from having the benefit of his accomplice's testimony, "the State arbitrarily denied him the right to put on the stand a witness who was
physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that
he had personally observed, and whose testimony would have
been relevant and material to the defense." (Emphasis
added.) Id., at 23.
Just as a State may not apply an arbitrary rule of competence to exclude a material defense witness from taking the
stand, it also may not apply a rule of evidence that permits a
witness to take the stand, but arbitrarily excludes material
portions of his testimony. In Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U. S. 284 (1973), the Court invalidated a State's hearsay rule
on the ground that it abridged the defendant's right to
"present witnesses in his own defense." Id., at 302. Chambers was tried for a murder to which another person repeatedly had confessed in the presence of acquaintances. The
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State's hearsay rule, coupled with a "voucher" rule that did
not allow the defendant to cross-examine the confessed murderer directly, prevented Chambers from introducing testimony concerning these confessions, which were critical to his
defense. This Court reversed the judgment of conviction,
holding that when a state rule of evidence conflicts with the
right to present witnesses, the rule may "not be applied
mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice," but must meet
the fundamental standards of due process. Ibid. In the
Court's view, the State in Chambers did not demonstrate
that the hearsay testimony in that case, which bore "assurances of trustworthiness" including corroboration by other
evidence, would be unreliable, and thus the defendant should
have been able to introduce the exculpatory testimony.
Ibid.
Of course, the right to present relevant testimony is not
without limitation. The right "may, in appropriate cases,
bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process." Id., at 295. 11 But restrictions of a
defendant's right to testify may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. In
applying its evidentiary rules a State must evaluate whether
the interests served by a rule justify the limitation imposed
on the defendant's constitutional right to testify.

IV
The Arkansas rule enunciated by the state courts does not /
allow a trial court to consider whether posthypnosis testiNumerous state procedural and evidentiary rules control the presentation of evidence and do not offend the defendant's right to testify. See,
e.g. , Cham bers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 302 (1973) ("In the exercise
of this right, the accused , as is required of the State, must comply with
established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence"); Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 23, n. 21 (1967) (opinion should not be construed
as disapproving testimonial privileges or nonarbitrary rules that disqualify
11
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mony may be admissible in a particular case; it is a per se rule
prohibiting the admission at trial of any defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony on the ground that such testimony
is always unreliable. 12 Thus, in Arkansas, an accused's testimony is limited to matters that he or she can prove were
remembered before hypnosis. This rule operates to the detriment of any defendant who undergoes hypnosis, without regard to the reasons for it, the circumstances under which it
took place, or any independent verification of the information
it produced. 13
In this case, the application of that rule had a significant
adverse effect on etitioner's ability to testify. It virtually
prevente her from descn mg any o
events that occurred on the day of the shooting, despite corroboration of
many of those events by other witnesses. Even more importantly, under the court's rule petitioner was not permitted to
describe the actual shooting except in the words contained in
Doctor Back's ·notes. The expert's description of the gun's
tendency to misfire would have taken on greater significance
if the jury had heard petitioner testify that she did not have
her finger on the trigger and that the gun went off when her
husband hit her arm.
those incapable of observing events due to mental infirmity or infancy from
being witnesses).
12
The rule leaves a trial judge no discretion to admit this testimony,
even if the judge is persuaded of its reliability by testimony at a pretrial
hearing. Tr. of Oral Arg. 36 (statement of the Attorney General of
Arkansas).
13
The Arkansas Supreme Court took the position that petitioner was
fully responsible for any prejudice that resulted from the restriction on her
testimony because it was she who chose to resort to the technique of hypnosis. Rock v. State, 288 Ark. 566, 580, 708 S. W. 2d 78, 86 (1986). The
prosecution and the trial court each expressed a similar view and the theme
was renewed repeatedly at trial as a justification for limiting petitioner's
testimony. See App. 15, 20, 21-22, 24, 36. It should be noted , however,
that Arkansas had given no previous indication that it looked with disfavor
on the use of hypnosis to assist in the preparation for trial and there were
no previous state-court rulings on the issue.
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In establishing its ~ e , the Arkansas Supreme
Court simply followed the approach taken by a number of
States that have decided that hypnotically enhanced testimony should be excluded at trial on the ground that it tends
to be unreliable. 14 O ~ t e s that have adopted an exclusionary rule, however, have done so for the testimony of witnesses, not for the testimony of a defendant. The Arkansas
Supreme Court failed to perform the constitutional analysis
that is necessary when a defendant's right to testify is at
stake. 15
1
• See, e. g., Contreras v. State, 718 P. 2d 129 (Alaska 1986); State ex rel.
Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 207-208, 644 P. 2d 1266,
1293-1294 (1982); People v. Quintanar, 659 P. 2d 710, 711 (Colo. App.
1982); State v. Davis, 490 A. 2d 601 (Del. Super. 1985); Bundy v. State, 471
So. 2d 9, 18-19 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, U. S. (1986); State v.
Moreno, - - Haw. - - , 709 P. 2d 103 (1985); State v. Haislip, 237 Kan.
461, 482, 701 P. 2d 909, 925-926, cert. denied, U. S. (1985); State
v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 464 A. 2d 1028 (1983); Commonwealth v. Kater,
388 Mass. 519, 447 N. E. 2d 1190 (1983); People v. Gonzales, 415 Mich. 615,
329 N. W. 2d 743 (1982), opinion added to, 417 Mich. 1129, 336 N. W. 2d
751 (1983); Alsbach v. Sadar, 700 S. W. 2d 823 (Mo. 1985); State v.
Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 218, 313 N. W. 2d 648, 655 (1981); People v.
Hughes, 59 N. Y. 2d 523, 453 N. E. 2d 484 (1983); Robison v. State, 677
P. 2d 1080, 1085 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 467 U. S. 1246 (1984);
Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 110, 436 A. 2d 170, 177 (1981);
State v. Martin, 101 Wash. 2d 713, 684 P. 2d 651 (1984). See State v.
Ture, 353 N. W. 2d 502, 513-514 (Minn. 1984).
5
' The Arkansas court relied on a California case, People v. Shirley, 31
Cal.3d 18, 723 P. 2d 1354, cert. denied, 459 U. S. 860 (1982), for much of its
reasoning as to the unreliability of hypnosis. 288 Ark., at 575-578, 708
S. W. 2d, at 83-84. But while the California court adopted a far stricter
general rule-barring entirely testimony by any witness who has been
hypnotized- it explicitly excepted testimony by an accused:
"[W]hen it is the defendant himself-not merely a defense witness-who
submits to pretrial hypnosis, the experience will not render his testimony
inadmissible if he elects to take the stand. In that case, the rule we adopt
herein is subject to a necessary exception to avoid impairing the fundamental right of an accused to testify in his own behalf." 31 Cal.3d, at 67,
723 P. 2d, at 1384.

\
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Although the Arkansas court concluded that any testimony
that cannot be proved to be the product of prehypnosis memory is unreliable, many courts have eschewed a per se rule
and permit the admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony. 16 Hypnosis by trained h sicians or psychologists has
been recognized as a va 1d t erapeutic tee mque smce 1958,
althoug there is no general y accepted t eory to exp am the
phenomenon, or even a consensus on a smg e efinition of
hypnosis. 'Council on Scientific Affairs, Scientific Status of
Refreshing Recollection by the Use of Hypnosis, 253
J. A. M. A. 1918, 1918-1919 (1985) (Council Report). 17 The
This case does not involve the admissibility of testimony of previously
hypnotized witnesses other than criminal defendants and we express no
opinion on that issue.
16
Some jurisdictions have adopted a rule that hypnosis affects the credibility, but not the admissibility, of testimony. See, e.g., Beck v. Norris,
801 F. 2d 242, 244-245 (CA6 1986); United States v. Awkard, 597 F. 2d
667, 669 (CA9), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 885 (1979); State v. Wren, 425 So.
2d 756 (La. 1983); State v. Brown, 337 N. W. 2d 138, 151 (N. D. 1983);
State v. Glebock, 616 S. W. 2d 897, 903-904 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981);
Chapman v. State, 638 P. 2d 1280, 1282 (Wyo. 1982).
Other courts conduct an individualized inquiry in each case. See, e. g.,
McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F. 2d 951, 958 (CA4 1987) (reliability evaluation); Wicker v. Mccotter, 783 F. 2d 487, 492-493 (CA5 1986) (probative
value of the testimony weighed against its prejudicial effect), cert. denied,
- - U. S. - - (1986); State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 618, 625, 682 P. 2d 571,
578 (1984) (weigh "totality of circumstances").
In some jurisdictions, courts have established procedural prerequisites
for admissibility in order to reduce the risks associated with hypnosis.
Perhaps the leading case in this line is State v. Hurd, 86 N. J. 525, 432 A.
2d 86 (1981). See also Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F. 2d
1112, 1122-1123 (CA8 1985), cert. denied, U. S. (1986); United
States v. Harrington, 18 M.J. 797, 803 (A. C. M. R. 1984); House v. State,
445 So. 2d 815, 826- 827 (Miss. 1984); State v. Beachum, 97 N. M. 682,
689-690, 643 P. 2d 246, 253-254 (N. M. App. 1981), writ quashed, 98 N. M.
51, 644 P. 2d 1040 (1982); State v. Weston, 16 Ohio App. 3d 279, 287, 475
N. E. 2d 805, 813 (1984); State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 329 N. W.
2d 386, cert. denied, 461 U. S. 946 (1983).
17
Hypnosis has been described as "involv[ing] the focusing of attention;
increased responsiveness to suggestions; suspension of disbelief with a low-

-

86-130-0PINION
ROCK v. ARKANSAS

15

use of hypnosis in criminal investigations, however, is controversial, and the current medical and legal view of its appropriate role is unsettled.
Responses of individuals to hypnosis vary greatly. The
popular belief that hypnosis guara~tees tlie accuracy of recall
is as yet without established foundation and, in fact, hypnosis
often has no effect at all on memory. The most common response to hypnosis, however, appears to be an increase in
both correct and incorrect recollections. 18 Three general
characteristics of hypnosis may lead to the introduction of inaccurate memories: the subject becomes "suggestible" and
may try to please the hypnotist with answers the subject
thinks will be met with approval; the subject is likely to "confabulate," that is, to fill in details from the imagination in
order to make an answer more coherent and complete; and,
the subject experiences "memory hardening," which gives
him great confidence in both true and false memories, making
effective cross-examination more difficult. See generally M.
Orne, et al., Hypnotically Induced Testimony, in Eyewitness
Testimony: Psychological Perspectives 171 (G. Wells and E.
Loftus, eds., 1985); Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use
of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 Calif. L.
Rev. 313, 333-342 (1980). Despite the unreliability that hypnosis concededly may introduce, however, the procedure has
been credited as instrumental in obtaining investigative leads
or identifications that were later confirmed by independent
ering of critical judgment; potential for altering perception, motor control,
or memory in response to suggestions; and the subjective experience -of
responding involuntarily. " Council Report, 253 J. A. M. A., at 1919.
18
"[W]hen hypnosis is used to refresh recollection, one of the following
outcomes occurs: (1) hypnosis produces recollections that are not substantially different from nonhypnotic recollections; (2) it yields recollections
that are more inaccurate than nonhypnotic memory; or, most frequently,
(3) it results in more information being reported , but these recollections
contain both accurate and inaccurate details . . .. There are no data to support a fourth alternative, namely, that hypnosis increases remembering of
only accurate information. " Id. , at 1921.
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evidence. See, e.g., People v. Hughes, 59 N. Y. 2d 523,
533, 453 N. E. 2d 484, 488 (1983); see generally R. Udolf,
Forensic Hypnosis 11-16 (1983).
The inaccuracies the process introduces can be reduced, although perhaps not eliminated, by the use of procedural safeguards. One set of suggested guidelines calls for hypnosis to
be performed only by a psychologist or psychiatrist with special training in its use and who is independent of the investigation. See Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in
Court, 27 Int'l J. Clinical & Experimental Hypnosis 311,
335-336 (1979). These procedures reduce the possibility
that biases will be communicated to the hypersuggestive subject by the hypnotist. Suggestion will be less likely also if
the hypnosis is conducted in a neutral setting with no one
present but the hypnotist and the subject. Tape or video
recording of all interrogations, before, during, and after hypnosis, can help reveal if leading questions were asked. Id.,
at 336. 19 Such guidelines do not guarantee the accuracy of
the testimony, because they cannot control the subject's own
motivations or any tendency to confabulate, but they do provide a means of controlling overt suggestions.
The more traditional means of assessing accuracy of testimony also remain applicable in the case of a previously hypnotized defendant. Certain information recalled as a result
of hypnosis may be verified as highly accurate by corroborating evidence. Cross-examination, even in the face of a confident defendant, is an effective tool for revealing inconsistencies. Moreover, a jury can be educated to the risks of
hypnosis through expert testimony and cautionary instru-ctions. Indeed, it is probably to a defendant's advantage to
establish carefully the extent of his memory prior to hypnosis, in order to minimize the decrease in credibility the procedure might introduce.
19

Courts have adopted varying versions of these safeguards. See n. 16,
Oregon by statute has adopted a requirement for procedural safeguards for hypnosis. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 136.675 (1985).
supra.
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We are not now prepared to endorse without qualifications
the ~se ~ ~ ~"g-asa ri nivestlgative tool; scientific understanding of the phenomenon and of the means to control the
effects of hypnosis is s~
cy. Arkansas, however,
has not justified the exclusion of all of a defendant's testimony that a defendant is unable to prove to be the product of
prehypnosis memory. A State's legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence does not extend to per se exclusions
that may be reliable in an individual case. Wholesale inadmissibility of a defendant's testimony is an arbitrary restriction on the right to testify in the absence of clear evidence by
the State repudiating the validity of all posthypnosis recollections. The State would be well within its powers if it established guidelines to aid trial courts in the evaluation of
posthypnosis testimony and it may be able to show that testimony in a particular case is so unreliable that exclusion is
justified. But it has not shown that hypnotically enhanced
testimony is always so untrustworthy and so immune to the
traditional means of evaluating credibility that it should disable a defendant from presenting her version of the events
for which she is on trial.
In this case, the defective condition of the gun corroborated the details petitioner remembered about the shooting.
The tape recordings provided some means to evaluate the
hypnosis and the trial judge concluded that Doctor Back did
not suggest responses with leading questions. See n. 3,
supra. Those circumstances present an argument for admissibility of petitioner's testimony in this particular case, an argument that must be considered by the trial court because or
petitioner's constitutional right to testify on her own behalf. 20
20
This disposition makes it unnecessary to consider petitioner's claims
that the trial court's order restricting her testimony was unconstitutionally
broad and that the trial court's application of the order resulted in a denial
of due process of law. We also need not reach petitioner's argument that
Arkansas' restriction on her testimony interferes with her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Petitioner concedes that there is a "substantial

I

~
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The judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas is vacated and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

question" whether she raised this federal question on appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court. Reply Brief for Petitioner 2.
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